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ABSTRACT
Environmental Justice and Participatory Democracy: An
Emancipatory Policy Proposal analyzes the the public 
participation guidelines for the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. The author argues that four challenges must be 
addressed before the goal of environmental justice can be 
achieved. These challenges include the challenge of citizen 
participation, the epistemological challenge, the challenge 
of integrating public values with technical concerns, and 
the challenge of balancing environmental rights and 
responsibilities. The author develops a policy proposal for 
the creation of neighborhood environmental justice community 
centers in low-income neighborhoods.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Public participation in hazardous waste policy is a 
challenge many federal, state, and local governments face. 
Hie history of hazardous waste policy in the United States 
provides a rich source for analyzing traditional models of 
decision making. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to 
analyze and critique current public participation procedures 
and to develop a model for neighborhood environmental 
justice centers in low income communities.
This study is timely because on February 11, 1994, 
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898.1 Clinton's 
Executive Order was carried out in response to demands made 
by environmental justice advocates during the 1990s who 
argued that many low-income and minority communities are 
chosen as sites for hazardous waste facilities. Advocates 
argue that racial and ethnic minorities are excluded from 
the decision making process because of "environmental 
racism." Thus, environmental justice advocates demand to be 
included as equal partners in the policy process in order to 
overcome racism.
1
Much has been written about the failure of current 
participatory mechanisms to involve the public in hazardous 
waste policy decisions substantively and legitimately.2 
Debates about the role of the public in environmental 
decision making are often between centralists who generally 
favor an elite model, and decentralists who support 
participatory democratic and empowerment models. The elite 
model is referred to as "traditional" decision making, while 
the participatory model is referred to as "emancipatory". 
These terms reflect two distinct environmental paradigms 
that can be discovered when the history of environmentalism 
in the United States is reviewed.3 I call these paradigms 
"traditional environmentalism" and "emancipatory 
environmentalism."
The "traditional" environmental paradigm grew out of 
the conservation/preservationist movements of the 
Progressive era in the early twentieth century. This 
paradigm was founded on the premise of scientific 
utilitarianism,4 which stressed the efficient use of 
resources through management. Implicit in this paradigm is 
the assumption that humans can and should manage and control 
the natural environment.5 This paradigm is implicitly 
founded on the biblical edict found in Genesis 1:28; that 
man should have dominion over the Earth. While this 
presumption informed environmentalism for many decades, the 
rise of civil rights, feminism, and anti-war movements
during the 1970s challenged generally accepted beliefs about 
"man's" relationship to the environment. This relationship 
had traditionally been hierarchical and anthropocentric. 
Although the relationships between civil rights, feminism, 
the anti-war movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
environmental movement seem tenuous, they are, in fact, 
similar in many respects. Each of these movements attempted 
to displace the hegemony of the hierarchical, 
anthropocentric, rationalist decision making model that 
informed social policy in the United States. Women, African 
Americans, and environmentalists sought to emancipate 
society from limiting beliefs that were rooted in Judeo- 
Christian ethics and modem science.
The emergence of the environmental justice movement 
during the 1980s and 1990s represented a significant change 
in the environmental agenda. Called "emancipatory 
environmentalism, "6 this emerging phase of the environmental 
movement challenges traditional Western conceptual 
frameworks, economic practices, social relationships, 
political processes, and ethical systems. Radical changes in 
the way we think, make decisions, relate to one another, and 
care for ourselves and our environment are necessary in 
order to achieve environmental justice, argue emancipatory 
environmentalists.7 Central to the emancipatory project is 
finding ways to end domination, including class domination, 
racism, patriarchy, and the domination of nature.
Emancipatory environmentalism thus expands the traditional 
environmental agenda to include social justice concerns. By 
redefining environmentalism, emancipatory environmentalism 
requires an inclusive, democratic decision making process 
based on a conception of justice that transforms current 
economic and social relationships.8 Thus, the policital 
process becomes emancipatory and transformative on an 
individual and social level.
When these two environmental paradigms clash, as they 
have in the hazardous waste policy arena, the legitimacy of 
the State's regulatory apparatus is at stake. To overcome 
the perception that hazardous waste decisions are not 
legitimate, Matheny and Williams conclude that "equal 
representation of all interests in the affected populations 
is essential."9 Equal representation assumes citizens have 
equal access to the policy process.
However, in a study of 233 Washington scientific risk 
professionals employed in the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and other non-governmental firms, Thomas Dietz 
and Robert Rycroft found that most risk professionals are 
white males.10 Twenty percent of the respondents were women 
and three percent were minorities.11 Thus, Dietz and Rycroft 
conclude that women and people of color are often under 
represented within the ranks of risk policy professionals.
If their conclusions are correct, then women and minorities 
are, in fact, excluded from the policy process. I call this
5exclusion "structural."
But another form of exclusion exists as well. This can 
be found in examining the ways women become involved in 
toxics struggles. When women become active in toxics 
politics, they most often prefer grassroots organizing 
tactics. Grassroots groups are often led by women who use 
different leadership styles that are implicitly informed by 
feminist standpoint epistemologies. Thus, the knowledge 
women draw on in toxic struggles differs from the knowledge 
traditionally used in environmental decision making. Women's 
knowledge arises out of their daily lived experiences as 
women, wives, and mothers. However, stereotypes of 
"hysterical housewives" often hinder opportunities for 
dialogue between members of racial, gender, and low-income 
groups and public officials. These opportunities are often 
truncated by the presence of conceptual/epistemological and 
structural barriers. An epistemological barrier thus hinders 
the realization of a truly participatory democratic process 
with many low-income, female and minority citizens being 
denied a "real" opportunity to participate in the policy 
process. Although citizens have a responsibility to protect 
the environment, many are denied a right to participate in 
the environmental protection policy process because of 
structural and epistemological barriers.
These barriers create several challenges that federal, 
state, and local environmental agencies must address as they
develop environmental justice strategies that meet the goal 
of true public participation. These challenges include 
achieving a balance between the technical values of modem 
science and public environmental values, the challenge of 
true citizen participation, the standpoint and rationalist 
epistemological challenge, and the rights and 
responsibilities challenge. Each of these challenges is 
addressed in the chapters that follow.
In Chapter Two I establish the historical context of 
contemporary environmental policy with the passage of 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) .
Within the first decade of the passage of NEPA, it became 
clear that traditional decision making models could not 
accommodate the emerging emancipatory environmental 
paradigm. I discuss each of the challenges as they were 
addressed by traditional methods.
In Chapter Three I discuss the emerging emancipatory 
environmental paradigm and establish the historical context 
from which it arose. This paradigm symbolizes the transition 
to a new phase of environmental politics in the United 
States that merges social and environmental justice 
concerns. The environmental justice movement is a multi­
cultural, multi-issue, global movement informed by critical 
and feminist theory. I examine two case studies: Love Canal 
and Emelle, Alabama to illustrate race, class, and gender
7exclusion in the policy process. These cases illustrate how 
gender and racial exclusion operate within the policy 
process.
In Chapter Four I discuss criticisms of the traditional 
decision making model. In the second half the chapter I 
analyze the guidelines for public participation and argue 
that structural barriers prevent substantive public 
participation because the process is based on the 
traditional decision making model. This model cannot 
accommodate environmental justice concerns because it is 
based on an epistemology that separates values and 
scientific rationality. Within the rationalist epistemology, 
values are not considered valid knowledge claims. Thus, 
policy clashes occur between the two paradigms because of 
value differences in humanism and scientific rationality. 
Citizens often approach policy decisions from a humanist 
perspective while policy experts approach decisions from a 
rationalist perspective. Consequently, communication between 
the two groups is often inpossible.
In Chapter Five I examine the epistemological challenge 
by examining differences between objectivist/rationalist and 
feminist standpoint epistemologies. The
objectivist/rationalist epistemology informs environmental 
decision making and has assumed hegemony in Western culture. 
Feminist standpoint epistemologies challenge this hegemony 
and offer an alternative basis for knowledge claims. Both of
8these epistemologies assume a particular standpoint. These 
standpoints have counterparts in moral theory and provide 
the basis for two distinct conceptions of justice.
In Chapter Six I explore the differences in conceptions 
of justice between emancipatory environmentalists and the 
EPA. I discuss Rawls's theory of justice, the Seventeen 
Principles of Environmental Justice, and Wenz's theory of 
environmental justice. I argue that environmental justice 
demands a conception of justice that is inclusive and is 
contextually based. Thus, relationships are important in 
environmental justice. But relationships have a dubious 
status in Rawlsian justice. I argue that Aristotle's theory 
of justice may provide us with a more complete theory of 
environmental justice.
Finally, in Chapter Seven I review the four challenges 
and present a policy proposal for the creation of 
neighborhood environmental justice centers. Because 
environmental decisions involve neighborhoods and 
communities, it is imperative that we create places where 
neighbors can come together to develop citizenship skills 
and political capacity. Although I do not develop an 
emancipatory decision making model, I believe that the 
creation of environmental justice centers will create a 
place for an emancipatory process to emerge.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The history of environmentalism in the United States 
reveals two distinct paradigms. In this chapter I discuss 
"traditional" environmentalism that arose from a desire to 
conserve and preserve the natural environment. The core 
values of traditional environmentalism are economic growth, 
domination over nature, and nature as a resource with 
instrumental value. This ideology was implicitly informed by 
the Judeo-Christian ethic that man had a right, if not a 
Divine obligation, to have dominion over all living things, 
including nature and women. Traditional environmentalism is 
thus founded on the belief that the environment can be 
managed through reform and regulation of industrial 
practices.1
Although conservationism began as "an anti-corporate 
social movement," both conservationist and preservationist 
environmental groups "managed to carve out for themselves a 
major role in the policy arena regarding resources and the 
natural environment."2 Thus, by the end of the Progressive 
era environmentalism had adopted "expertise and rational 
management of resources for business uses as the movement1s
10
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dominant ideology."3 This "right use" ideology informed 
environmentalism through the post-World War II era. 
Traditional environmental groups were organized around 
wildlife and wilderness preservation and conservation. 
Consequently, the anti-corporate stance taken by the earlier 
conservationists was soon replaced by the "regulate and 
reform" ideology. Man could continue to dominate nature but 
only if he used rational methods to control his impact on 
the environment.
With the publication of Rachel Carson's book Silent 
Spring in 1962, the reform and regulate ideology was 
challenged. Before the publication of Silent Spring, the 
environmental movement in the United States was "a 
revolution waiting for a manifesto."4 The manifesto came 
with Rachel Carson's presentation of "scientific evidence in 
clear, poetic, and moving prose that demonstrated how the 
destruction of nature and the threat to human health from 
pollution were completely intertwined. "5 But more important 
was the fact that Carson implicitly questioned the rational 
methods used to control man's impact on the environment. If 
ecosystems were being destroyed, then the argument that 
rational, right use methodologies could mitigate 
environmental impact was invalid. Thus, the conservationist 
approach of resource management may have worked at the turn 
of the century but could no longer address contemporary 
environmental problems.
The release of Silent Spring and its meteoric rise as a 
best seller "was a triggering event for the entire 
environmental movement because it mobilized the average 
American."6 Public awareness about the dangers of pesticides 
and inorganic chemicals increased in the United States.7 
Silent Spring broadened the boundaries of traditional 
environmentalism from remote wildlife areas to "everyone's 
backyard." Environmental protection became everyone's 
responsibility. How could the average American protect their 
backyards from environmental degradation when most 
environmental damage occurred because of corporate 
industrial practices and the voices of average Americans 
were absent from policy discussions about environmental 
impacts? Because most Americans had no say in the impact 
modem industrial practices had on the environment, by the 
late 1960s it was clear that legislation was necessary to 
stem environmental assault.
During the 1970s, many environmental laws were passed 
beginning with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
in 1969. Sweeping in scope, NEPA provided the framework for 
a new model of statutory legislation that specifically 
addressed man's relationship to the environment.8 While many 
environmental laws predated NEPA, none of the previous 
legislation provided a comprehensive approach to 
environmental protection. NEPA thus provided a statutory 
framework for environmental subsequent environmental
13
legislation.
The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge
Although NEPA section 101(c) initially provided
citizens with "a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment," the Conference Committee changed the
Act to read "each person should enjoy a healthful
environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment."9 During the NEPA debates held on December 20,
1969, Henry M. Jackson, Senator from Washington, voiced his
opposition to this change for the record by arguing that
every person does have a fundamental and an 
inalienable right to a healthful environment.
If this is not the law of this land, if an 
individual in this great country of ours 
cannot at the present time protect his right 
and the right of his family to a healthful 
environment, then it is my view that some 
fundamental changes are in order.10
Congress institutionalized environmental
responsibilities but did not guarantee citizens a legal
right to a healthful environment. Although Senator Jackson
stated in the record he would introduce an environmental
rights bill, the bill was never ratified. Many states,
including Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, explicitly gave
citizens the right to a clean environment in the post-NEPA
years. Thus, some states approach environmental protection
from a balanced approach.
Balancing rights and responsibilities was not the only
14
challenge facing the federal government in the post-NEPA 
decade, as we shall see in the next section.
The Challenge of Values, Science, and Epistemology
Shortly after signing the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) into law in January 1970, President Richard M. 
Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by 
Executive Order 11514 on March 5, 1970. EPA consolidated six 
thousand employees from fifteen government agencies located 
in three departments.11 For exanple, solid waste programs 
were moved from the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare' (HEW) to EPA.12
NEPA explicitly stated that achieving a balance between 
technical/economic concerns and environmental values and 
amenities was important. Section 102(2)b of NEPA mandates 
that
all agencies of the Federal Government 
shall. . .identify and develop methods and 
procedures...which will insure that presently 
unquantified environmental amenities and 
values may be given appropriate 
considerations in decision-making along with 
economic and technical considerations.13
However, the approach taken by EPA during its formative
years was founded on the same assumption that informed
environmental legislation and traditional environmentalism:
that science could provide solutions to the environmental
crisis through regulation and management.14 This presumption
is implicit in the traditional environmental paradigm. An
15
overriding confidence in the ability of modem science and 
technology to solve environmental problems is a key tenet in 
the traditional paradigm. Implicit in this assumption is the 
belief that rational methods will yield the best decisions 
about the environment. As we shall see later, rationalist 
epistemologies separate facts and values. Thus, balancing 
technical and scientific facts with public values is 
virtually impossible when using a rationalist epistemology 
as the dominant mode of creating knowledge.
During the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Senate debates held on December 20, 1969, Senator Henry M. 
Jackson argued that inadequacies in "present knowledge, 
policies, and institutions for environmental management" 
threatened "the quality of life all men seek. "1S Although 
Jackson did not explicitly point out the limits of 
traditional rationalist epistemologies, he argued that human 
dignity was threatened by the expansive and impersonal 
technology modem science has created.16 Thus, Jackson 
implicitly questioned the epistemological premises of modem 
science by arguing that science was "inpersonal." If an 
impersonal technology was the result of modem science and 
the epistemological presumptions on which it was based, 
could modem science provide solutions to the environmental 
crisis? This question plagued EPA from its inception.
EPA personnel were often "compelled to act under 
conditions of substantial uncertainty" because the agency's
16
role was to protect the public and the environment in a
timely fashion.17 Given "the inherent limitations of
science," EPA personnel often had to assume their knowledge
was greater than it actually was and make decisions based on
these assumptions.18
Sally Fairfax suggests that it is not science itself
that is limited but the approach taken by EPA. Instead of
conducting "pure research" which is how science should be
conducted, Fairfax argues that NEPA and the practices
adopted by EPA
rest on the assumption that there is virtue in simply 
amassing and circulating scientific data...NEPA 
reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific 
truth and the utility of scientific evidence. . .
However, NEPA has distorted the direction of scientific 
inquiry by putting tremendous amounts of money and 
effort into applied research. The science in impact 
statements is not disciplined and not cumulative.
Proper scientific inquiry must proceed gradually, under 
the full scrutiny of a skeptical and disciplined 
profession. It cannot be rushed or obliged to take 
positions on current issues if it is to be credible or 
valid. It seems reasonable to suggest that one of the 
long-term effects of NEPA will be the distortions it 
has caused in the science it relies on.19
While science offered hope for the improvement of
environmental problems, it was limited, imperfect, and
subject to ideological and political manipulation.20 Despite
the misuses and inperfections of modem science, there were
no alternatives for alleviating environmental problems.
The Challenge Of Citizen Participation
Since citizen involvement in environmental policy was
17
mandated by NEPA through the Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) process and explicitly sanctioned through President 
Nixon's Executive Order 11514,21 EPA faced another 
challenge: the challenge of citizen participation. Despite 
criticisms about the quality of citizen involvement in 
environmental policy, subsequent environmental legislation 
followed the framework established by the spirit of NEPA as 
a "people's policy."
A review of post-NEPA legislation indicates that 
public participation in the environmental policy process was 
included in most environmental laws. The Clean Air Acts of 
1970 and 1977, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976 (TOSCA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976 (RCRA), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) contained 
provisions for public involvement. Although the legislative 
intent of NEPA and subsequent environmental legislation may 
have been philosophically aligned with the principles of 
democratic participation, policy implementation proved to be 
problematic, particularly in the area of hazardous waste 
policy.
Signed into law in 1976,22 the purpose of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was to provide a 
regulatory framework for a "cradle to grave" manifest 
tracking system for hazardous wastes.23 In keeping with the
18
pluralistic model of decision making that evolved during the
1960s and early 1970s, policymakers included provisions for
public participation in hazardous waste facility planning.
Section 7004 (b) of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act defines the parameters of public involvement as
[p]ublic participation in the development, 
revision, implementation, and enforcement of 
any regulation, guideline, information, or 
program under this chapter shall be provided 
for, encouraged, and assisted by the 
Administrator and the States. The 
Administrator, in cooperation with the 
States, shall develop and publish minimum 
guidelines for public participation in such 
processes.24
By the late 1970s hazardous waste had assumed a
prominent place on the political agenda, making public
participation in the facility siting process a highly
controversial, and sometimes impossible task. At the July 1,
1977 hearing held to review the public participation
guidelines for RCRA, Tom Williams, co-chairperson of the
guideline work group, read a statement by EPA Administrator,
Douglas Costle, which affirmed the importance of public
participation in hazardous waste management programs.
Genuine public awareness and participation 
are essential for a number of 
reasons...Unless the public has a reasonable 
opportunity to learn about the thousands of 
hazardous and somewhat less hazardous open 
dumps, pits, ponds, and lagoons which exist 
throughout our county, leeching their 
witches' brew into the ground water, the 
timely implementation of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act will suffer.25
Testimony given at the public hearing applauded efforts
19
by lawmakers and EPA administrators to institutionalize 
public participation in the implementation of RCRA. Despite 
agreement about the importance of citizen participation in 
hazardous waste facility siting decisions, most of the 
testimony reflected a pessimistic tone about the mandated 
public participation requirements found in RCRA.
Nonetheless, guidelines for public participation were 
developed and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.26
Despite attempts by EPA to understand and thus 
alleviate public fear about waste disposal and treatment 
practices, public opposition to hazardous waste disposal 
sites remained a problem by the late 1970s. Viewed by policy 
analysts as the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome, this 
perspective renders the location of a facility as the 
problem instead of the technology that produces the waste.27 
Conversely, those who view the facility itself as the 
problem refer to public opposition as a reaction against a 
"Locally Unwanted Land Use" (LULU) .28 NIMBY movements are 
often parochial, while LULU movements challenge the 
necessity of a given technology. Thus, NIMBY and LULU 
movements reflect different political ideologies.
Because grassroots groups became a major obstacle in 
the successful inplementation of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, the EPA Office of Solid Waste contracted 
with a Washington D.C. consulting firm to study the facility 
siting problem. The report, Siting of Hazardous Waste
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Management Facilities and Public Opposition, written by
Centaur and Associates, was released in November, 1979.29
The purpose of the Centaur project was twofold. First,
it sought to understand the factors that contributed to the
public's opposition to hazardous waste facilities. Second,
it intended to identify, by examining case studies of thirty
siting situations, actions that exacerbated or mitigated
public opposition to siting.30 Since the study was conducted
before the public participation guidelines for the RCRA were
codified, the report does not address the effectiveness of
those guidelines but does shed light on many of the problems
inherent in the siting process.
The study concluded that "probably the most important
single factor in addressing public opposition to siting is
the coordination and communication with the public and local
officials."31 Local opposition, the study reported,
is rooted in fear of major and long-term 
risks posed by facilities to the health and 
welfare of the surrounding community. It 
reflects a loss of faith by local residents 
in the ability of government and private 
industry to solve environmental problems and 
simultaneously to consider and protect local 
interests.32
While affected communities discussed "fears and risks," 
industry officials spoke in terms of "regulations and 
technology" and "the terms of one are often not understood 
by the other."33 Thus, dialogue between was difficult 
because residents framed the issue as a justice issue while 
technical experts framed the problem as one of science and
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regulations. Although citizens usually questioned the 
fairness of how environmental burdens are distributed, 
industry rarely addressed equity and justice concerns.
Despite the techniques used in several siting studies 
to involve the public, failure to involve the public in 
substantive ways was common. Substantive participation was 
defined in the report as allowing "the public to provide 
substantive input to [sic] technical and nontechnical 
aspects of government decision-making.1,34 Although the 
report does not explicitly address the integration of values 
in public participation processes, the definition of 
"substantive input" can be interpreted to mean discussion of 
public environmental values, including justice and equity.35
Although NEPA "stipulated that social sciences were to 
be integrated into the decision processes,1,36 demographic 
and social analyses appeared to go beyond the scope of the 
EPA. When Ruckelshaus appeared before the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission he claimed that EPA was a "technical and 
scientific agency not equipped to judge disparate inpacts on 
minority and low-income communities due to pollution.1137 
Thus, EPA was ill-equipped to address justice and equity 
concerns from the outset.
Sally Fairfax argues that "the public involvement that 
NEPA has induced is so formal, so predictable, and so 
proposal-oriented that it seems to have stultified the 
dialogue between agencies and the public that was beginning
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to develop in the late 1960s.1,38 She concludes that NEPA 
actually truncated "citizen involvement in agency 
deliberative processes." This problem was exacerbated when 
Ronald Reagan was sworn into office in January 1981. Gains 
made by environmental groups during the Nixon and Carter 
administrations were undermined by the Reagan administration 
through the reduction of fiscal support for citizen 
participation programs in environmental decision making.
Stephen J. Durham, an EPA Regional Administrator in 
Denver, stated in an internal memo that " [n]o grant awards 
to a State, or any other entity, should contain any funds 
for public relations or public participation unless such 
activities are mandated by Federal statute or regulation.1,39 
The reason given for cutting public participation funds by 
Mr. Durham's assistant, Judy Herb, was " [m]ost of the public 
participation money was going to environmental groups, not 
citizens' groups, and he didn't think it was right for the 
taxpayers to foot the bill for them. "40
By pulling federal support for citizen participation 
programs, Reagan effectively crippled local attenpts to 
insure citizen involvement in the controversial problem of 
hazardous waste disposal. With little guidance from the EPA, 
states were left on their own to carry out public 
participation programs as unfunded mandates. The growth of 
the NIMBY syndrome (Not In My Back Yard) may have been a 
direct outgrowth of the lack of support for public
23
involvement programs by the federal government during the 
Reagan administration41 and the institutionalization of 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as the preferred method of 
evaluating policy impacts.42
Citizen involvement in the environmental decision 
making process was thus complicated by the inadequacies of 
traditional decision methodologies that separated facts and 
values into two distinct epistemological realms. While 
citizens approached the policy process from a humanist 
perspective, experts adopted a rationalist approach that 
required objectivity. Thus, true dialogue and citizen 
participation was truncated by the presence of a policy 
process that could not bridge the epistemological gap 
between facts and values. Whether this is the cause of 
environmental injustice is a matter of much speculation and 
one that goes beyond this study. However, it appears that a 
combination of many factors contributed to the emergence of 
the environmental justice movement in the late 1980s. The 
reliance on experts to solve societal problems, the 
limitations of rationalist decision making methodologies, 
and conservative politics came together to create a milieu 
that made environmental injustice a reality.
Conclusions
Several challenges faced EPA in the two decades of 
environmental policy iirplementation. In conclusion, I review
the challenges raised throughout this chapter.
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The Technical/Scientific and Public Values Challenge
At first glance, NEPA and EPA appeared to offer 
solutions to the worsening problem of environmental 
degradation through the application of traditional 
scientific and technical methods. However, the environmental 
problems of the late twentieth century were not merely 
scientific and technical problems amenable to reform and 
regulation. Instead, environmental problems were political 
and economic problems that could not be solved by applied 
science. Although EPA attempted to protect the public and 
the environment through science, environmental problems 
involved more than science. Considerations of distributive 
justice and environmental values were important in the 
public participation process. However, limitations of the 
traditional decision making model and rationalist 
epistemologies truncated the possibilities for addressing 
justice and equity concerns.
The Epistemological Challenge
Although logical positivism has been discredited as an 
epistemology by philosophers of science,43 it remains 
"firmly institutionalized in legislative and administrative 
requirements."44 NEPA and EPA did not escape the normative 
philosophical assunptions of logical positivist theory.45
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NEPA mandated that technical/scientific and environmental 
values should be balanced in the decision process, but the 
epistemological requirements of traditional scientific 
methodologies, which were adopted by EPA, are not amenable 
to considerations of justice and fairness. Judging fairness 
of the distribution of environmental burdens was beyond the 
scope of EPA analytic methodologies because the distinction 
between objective science and values is a central 
distinction made by logical positivism. Thus, experts and 
citizens often approached environmental problems from 
different perspectives. One approach was decidedly humanist 
and value laden while the other approach was objective and 
value neutral.
The Challenge of Citizen Participation
Although NEPA is credited for expanding the role of 
citizens in the environmental policy process through the 
Environmental Impact Statement46 (EIS) process, some 
opponents of NEPA argue that citizen involvement in 
environmental policy actually predated NEPA.47 Certainly the 
Administrative Procedures Act of 194648 (APA) existed before 
NEPA and opened the rule making process to citizens through 
a variety of methods.49 Critics, however, argue that NEPA 
did little to foster meaningful citizen involvement in the 
policy process. Without federal support to supplement local 
citizen groups efforts to find the technical knowledge
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necessary to participate as equal partners in the decision­
making process, many low-income and minority citizens were 
excluded from the hazardous waste facility siting process. 
This was exacerbated by the Reagan administration's attitude 
toward public participation. By pulling funds for citizen 
groups, Reagan effectively crippled local citizens attempts 
to participate as equal partners in the process.
The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge
While NEPA initially guaranteed fundamental rights to 
all citizens for clean air, soil, and water, word changes 
during the Committee drafting process eliminated 
environmental rights. Citizens, however, were expected to 
accept responsibility for maintaining and enhancing the 
quality of the environment without any statutory guarantee 
of environmental rights. By failing to balance environmental 
responsibilities with environmental rights, NEPA may have 
contributed to the rise of grassroots activism in low-income 
and minority communities as citizens became aware of the 
class contradictions inherent in environmental policies.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF EMANCIPATORY ENVIRONMENTALISM
As we saw in the last chapter, Henry M. Jackson,
Senator from Washington, was a key player in the NEPA Senate 
debates. Jackson, critical of the impersonal technology that 
threatened the environment, also recognized that "a new kind 
of revolutionary movement" was underway in the United 
States. Environmental concern thus shifted from "the 
exclusive province of a few conservation organizations to 
the campus, to the urban ghettos, and to the suburbs."1
This concern captured the nation's attention on April 
22, 1970. Earth Day dawned during a period of social 
upheaval and cultural transformation that reached a zenith 
by the late 1960s. The social justice and liberation 
ideologies of the civil rights, anti-war, and women's 
movements provided the philosophical basis for emancipatory 
environmentalism as did the world views of indigenous and 
native cultures. Emancipatory environmentalism thus presumes 
the metaphor of "web of life" to capture an essential 
difference between the two environmental paradigms.
Since all problems are viewed as interconnected, 
emancipatory environmentalists believe that radical social
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change is necessary to achieve justice. Emancipatory
environmentalists integrate social and environmental
justice. Thus, social problems have an environmental
dimension. However, the traditional environmental paradigm
cannot accommodate the social dimensions of environmental
impacts because it utilized a "single issue approach."2
Citing differences in goals and strategies, James N.
Smith argues that traditional environmentalists groups would
conflict with groups seeking "social justice and equal
opportunity.1,3 Smith postulated that
an elite, upper middle class, exclusively 
white sector of American society is using the 
environment to protect ' it1 s own room at the 
top' from the encroachments of those less 
favorably placed on the social and economic 
ladder.4
If environmental organizations failed to address these 
issues, Smith predicted that the environmental movement and 
social justice movements were on a collision course. It 
would be, as Smith warned, a clash between the "haves and 
the have nots." He argued that critics of the environmental 
movement, including black activists, blue collar workers, 
and scholars, insisted the environment movement was 
"consciously elitist."5
Smith's predictions came true as low-income and 
minority women organized grassroots groups in communities 
chosen as sites for hazardous waste facilities. This 
environmental activism provides the political and 
philosophical basis for an inclusive, multi-cultural, multi-
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issue, emancipatory environmental movement informed by 
ecofeminist theories.
Women and Waste Policy
The link between housing and sanitation policy was 
clearly established during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century in large urban areas with the rise of industrialism. 
The efforts of Jane Addams and the establishment of the 
settlement house movement in Chicago during the late 1880s 
provides historical evidence to support my argument that 
waste disposal methods and policies are issues of home and 
family. A critical examination of women's labor reveals the 
degree to which women are concerned with waste in their 
daily lives. From changing diapers, to sorting garbage for 
recycling, to cleaning the house, washing dishes and 
clothes, and caring for the sick, waste disposal methods are 
part and parcel of women's daily life. Waste disposal 
methods, and the attendant social and health concerns, have 
traditionally been a social problem of particular concern to 
social workers, public health professionals, and women.6 
However, as we saw in the last chapter, EPA consolidated 
waste programs which had previously been housed in HEW. By 
moving waste from HEW to EPA, the social aspect of waste 
policy shifted from the realm of women and social work to 
the realm of scientific experts.
As women and mothers became involved in local toxic
struggles during the 1980s and 1990s, the environmental 
frame of waste policy shifted from "issues of science" to 
include "personal experience and pain".7 Yet women's 
involvement in toxic struggles are complicated by "the 
exclusion of most people from the policy process.1,8 
Typically, low-income women represent the community while 
middle class white males represent government and industry. 
When women realize that government policies do not protect 
their families, this awareness "exposes the false assumption 
that the traditional policy process will be democratic and 
responsive to their needs."9
By organizing their communities and neighborhoods 
against hazardous waste facilities, many low-income women 
develop an awareness of how gender and class inequities 
shape the policy process.10 Through their involvement in 
environmental justice struggles, participants' political 
beliefs are often transformed as they develop critiques of 
liberal democracy.11 For women, this process of political 
consciousness raising is irrplicitly informed by feminist 
theory.12 Thus, the hazardous waste policy process is 
potentially an emancipatory, transformative political 
process for many women that links demands for social justice 
with environmental justice.
The experiences of Hazel Johnson, a fifty-seven-year- 
old mother of seven, and resident of Chicago's Altgeld 
Gardens, exemplify the type of activism that emerged in the
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post-NEPA decade. Johnson organized "People for Community 
Recovery," the first grassroots environmental group located 
in a public housing project. Although the government knew 
that the hazardous waste facilities surrounding her 
neighborhood were the probable cause of health problems, 
Johnson argues EPA officials failed to enforce hazardous 
waste policies.
Johnson's skeptical attitude toward EPA stems from her 
lived experience as a resident of Altgeld Gardens where she 
witnessed women suffering miscarriages, giving birth to 
babies with congenital anomalies, and the early death of her 
husband in 1969. Although her husband smoked, Johnson 
wonders if his death may have been caused by constant 
exposure to the "toxic doughnut" created by hazardous waste 
facilities that surrounds her neighborhood.
Although residents in Altgeld Gardens showed a higher 
incidence of chronic lung diseases and troubled pregnancies 
in a survey done by the University of Illinois School of 
Health, Dr. Herbert White concluded that no clear-cut 
pattern of cause and effect can be established support 
arguments that increased incidence of disease in the area 
was caused by pollution.13
Johnson's experiences are not unlike those of other 
low-income women who find themselves and their families 
affected by hazardous waste policies in the United States. 
Through their day-to-day existence as mothers, caretakers,
36
and community residents, low-income women living near 
hazardous waste facilities often conclude that environmental 
policies created to protect the public are not legitimate. 
Although Johnson does not explicitly argue that she does not 
have environmental rights, her arguments implicitly contain 
this conclusion. Thus, Johnson's experiences provide 
evidence to support the argument that environmental justice 
requires a balanced rights and responsibilities approach.
Lois Gibbs' story of her organizing experiences in Love 
Canal illustrates many of the points made in the previous 
discussion about the political transformation of women who 
become involved in toxic struggles. More important, the Love 
Canal case study illustrates the importance of gender and 
class in the policy process.
Love Canal
In what could be called a bitter twist of irony, 
residents of Love Canal, a working and middle class 
neighborhood, confronted the chemical contamination of their 
community during the mid-1970s. Toxic waste dumped by Hooker 
Chemical Company spewed into neighboring waterways and 
canals; seeped through residents' basement walls, causing 
strange illnesses, miscarriages, and birth defects. When 
local officials were unable to assist residents, a young 
mother and resident of Love Canal, Lois Marie Gibbs 
organized the neighborhood in "very rude and very crude" 
political activity.14
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Gibbs chose this form of grassroots organizing because 
she found that the normal policy process was unfair.
Although Gibbs initially believed that the policy process 
was democratic, she eventually discovered through her 
organizing experience, that the process is dominated by 
powerful corporate and government officials.15 Dismissed by 
government and corporate officials as an "hysterical 
housewife," Gibbs overcame sexist stereotypes and 
successfully captured the attention of local and state 
officials.
By involving mothers and children in the antitoxic 
movement at Love Canal, Lois Gibbs expanded the emancipatory 
environmental agenda to include issues of class and 
gender.16 At a meeting between Governor Hugh Carey and Love 
Canal Homeowners, Gibbs and other mothers from her 
neighborhood led a parade of pre-schoolers to the front of 
the auditorium. Gibbs asked Carey if he was going to allow 
the children of Love Canal to die from exposure to toxic 
chemicals.17 By bringing private concerns of daily family 
life into the public arena, Gibbs used the knowledge she 
created from her social position as a woman and a mother to 
impact public policy thus expanding the definition of 
emancipatory environmentalism to include gender.
Although Love Canal involved class and gender issues, 
race is a variable in hazardous waste struggles as well. In 
the next section I discuss the emergence of the
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environmental justice movement.
Environmental Racism
Environmental justice movement is often associated with 
"environmental racism," a term coined by Dr. Benjamin Chavis 
at a press conference held in Washington D.C. to announce 
the conclusions of a United Church of Christ study on race 
and the environment. The United Church of Christ Commission 
for Racial Justice report, released in 1897, concluded that 
race is the most significant variable in the location of 
hazardous waste facilities.18 In the preface to the UCC 
report, Chavis attributes the problem to "institutional 
racism." Environmental racism became the focus of research 
for many minority scholars during the next decade, including 
the siting of the largest hazardous waste facility in the 
United States.19
Warren, County and the GAO Report
Before discussing the Emelle case, however, we need to 
understand the history of the environmental justice 
movement. In 1982, the state of North Carolina sited a PCB 
facility in a predominantly poor, black, community in Warren 
County, a community with a history of civil rights 
struggles. The waste facility was necessary because a New 
Jersey hazardous waste disposal company illegally dumped 
PCB-laced oil on the backroads of Warren County while 
residents slept. Rather than ship the contaminated dirt out
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of state, environmental officials and experts decided to 
site the facility within the state's borders in Warren 
County.
When residents learned about the decision to site the 
facility, they used civil rights organizing strategies to 
protest the decision. Using civil disobedience, residents 
blocked the trucks carrying the PCB-contaminated dirt and
oil. Over five hundred protesters were arrested, including 
Dr. Benjamin Chavis, then Director of the United Church of 
Christ Commission for Racial Justice. Representative Walter 
Fauntroy, a member of Congress, was among those arrested. As 
a result of his arrest, Fauntroy asked the General 
Accounting Office to conduct a study on the location of 
hazardous waste facilities in EPA's Region IV.
The 1983 General Accounting Office (GAO) report found 
correlations between race, income, and the location of 
offsite landfills in the Environmental Protection Agency's 
Region IV.20 EPA's Region IV includes Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee, states historically associated with 
civil rights struggles. The GAO report revealed a pattern: 
hazardous waste treatment facilities in the South are often 
sited in poor, rural, predominantly black and Native 
American communities. While the GAO report indicated a clear 
pattern of the location of facilities and racial and 
economic variables existed, it did not attribute race as the
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cause of the pattern.
Emelle
The Emelle case is significant because it symbolizes 
the innpact newly created environmental policies had on a 
community with a history of racial differences. In the early 
1980s during Governor George Wallace's administration, the 
largest hazardous waste facility in the United States was 
built near Emelle, a small, Southern predominantly black 
community in Sumter County, with a population of slightly 
over six hundred residents. Of those residents, seventy-nine 
percent were black. Many of the residents were elderly and 
poor.21 Ninety-three percent of the total Black population 
lived below the poverty line.22
Emelle is situated in a part of the South called the 
"black belt" - an area plagued by high rates of 
unemployment.23 Sumter County lies on a bed of Selma chalk, 
a geologically desirable location for a hazardous waste 
facility.24 In a 1974 report to Congress on hazardous waste 
disposal, EPA recommended areas with Selma chalk as 
favorable sites for the location of hazardous waste disposal 
facilities.25
James Parsons, son-in-law of then Governor George 
Wallace, had ties to a company called Resource Industries, 
which bought the land near Emelle. In 1978, the site was 
sold to Chemical Waste Management, a company that owns four 
out of the six largest landfills in the country. The company
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expanded the landfill after it was purchased. Residents were 
unaware that the landfill was used to store hazardous waste 
until workers began complaining about working conditions and 
health problems.26 Residents were not aware of the facility 
because the Environmental Impact Statement policy processes 
was not followed.
In State of Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F 2d 
499 (11th Cir. 1990), the court upheld an EPA decision that 
allowed Chemical Waste Management to site a hazardous waste 
facility without preparing an Environmental Impact 
Statement, as required by NEPA. Since RCRA came later in the 
history of environmental legislation, the court reasoned, it 
trumped NEPA requirements.27 The court argued that RCRA was 
functionally equivalent to NEPA, thus the RCRA permit 
process met EIS requirement.
Petitioners in the case argued that citizens were 
denied "a meaningful opportunity" to participate in the 
permitting process. The petitioners argued that EPA made it 
difficult for the public to access information prior to the 
permitting process; that EPA failed to provide the 
information in an understandable form; and failed to provide 
more than a "pro forma" public information hearing on the 
day of the hearing.28 However, the court ruled that 
EPA did not violate any procedural rules in the permitting 
process. Therefore, the court rejected the petitioners' 
claims that they were denied an opportunity for meaningful
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participation.
EPA did provide the public with an opportunity to 
attend a public information session on the day of the permit 
hearing. Many residents, because of their impoverished 
status, were not able to attend the meeting, or were not 
able to understand the highly technical documents. This 
raises questions about the definition of "meaningful 
opportunity. "
Wendell Paris, a resident of Emelle, argues that the 
dominance of white control within the local government and 
the lack of "informed, active black population in the black 
population" set the stage for Chemical Waste Management1s 
success in siting the largest hazardous waste facility in 
Emelle.29 Robert Bullard supports Paris's conclusion by 
arguing that the success of NIMBY movement during the 1980s 
caused hazardous waste facilities "follow the path of least 
resistance," thus causing them to end up in "poor, 
powerless, black communities."30 As white, affluent 
neighborhoods become increasingly more successful in 
fighting hazardous waste facilities from locating in their 
communities, black communities were often targeted as sites 
for unwanted land uses.31
Compelling evidence supports the conclusion that the 
distributional effects of hazardous policy implementation 
unfairly burden those who receive the least benefit. Women, 
minorities, and low-income people are typically
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disadvantaged in the current economic system. The Emelle 
case supports the argument that low income and minority 
citizens are often excluded from the hazardous waste policy 
process because they are excluded from positions of power 
where decisions are made.
Conclusions
The Technical/Scientific and Public Values Challenge
By bringing private concerns to the public1s attention, 
Lois Gibbs effectively challenged the dominant view that 
private concerns have no place in the public policy arena. 
Through her activism, Gibbs showed that women involved in 
local struggles can effectively use their social positions 
as women and mothers to link local concerns to national 
political issues. Prior to 1976, hazardous waste policy was 
not an issue that captured national attention. After Love 
Canal, most citizens were aware of the potential threat 
waste posed to their communities. The actions of Hooker 
Chemical became a symbol of the dangers unethical corporate 
practices could wreak on the lives of innocent people. It 
became clear that considerations of justice and fairness 
needed to be integrated into the policy process. But the 
limitations of rationalist epistemologies truncate 
possibilities for value discussions within the policy 
process because values are not considered valid knowledge.
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The Epistemological Challenge
When hazardous waste struggles are viewed within the 
larger context of social and political relationships, women 
often develop a critical perspective about the role of 
science in government policies. Since science is based on a 
rationalist epistemology it explicitly excludes values as a 
source of knowledge. Thus, environmental policy discussions 
exclude considerations of environmental justice. This raises 
important questions about the epistemological presumptions 
of separation and connection, objectivity and subjectivity, 
reason and emotion.
The Challenge of Citizen Participation
In addition to the epistemological challenge, the 
policy process is challenged by differing interpretations of 
"meaningful opportunity." Residents of Emelle argued that 
they were denied a "meaningful opportunity" to participate 
in the process. Had the court found in their favor, a 
precedent for finding the EPA guilty of environmental 
injustice would have been established. This is because 
opportunity to accept or reject a risk is an inportant 
component of justice. Citizens, however, are not guaranteed 
a right to environmental protection.
The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge
While NEPA clearly specifies responsibilities to
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maintaining the environment, this requirement is not 
balanced with the right to a healthful environment.
Residents in Love Canal, New York; Emelle, Alabama; and 
Warren County, North Carolina fought for freedom from toxic 
contamination. If NEPA guaranteed environmental rights as 
was the original intention of the bill's authors, these 
cases might not exist today. But this is a matter of much 
speculation.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
In this chapter I examine guidelines for public 
participation in environmental programs. These guidelines 
apply explicitly to the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water Act. 
While other environmental laws require public participation, 
most notably CERCLA or Superfund, the guidelines are 
restricted to the laws mentioned above.
While there are many models of public participation, I 
examine the traditional, elite model which relies on the 
judgment of experts. Within the traditional environmental 
paradigm, the dominant belief is that environmental problems 
can be managed through industrial reform and State 
regulation. Hence, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
were created as State administered policies that require a 
complex regulatory structure managed by scientific and 
technical experts. The regulatory structure is bureaucratic 
in the classical Weberian sense1 and based on 
instrumentalism, a pragmatic philosophy that maintains 
thought is both functional and instrumental in controlling
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and managing environmental problems. Instrumental 
rationality is the direct application of instrumentalism. 
While the epistemological assunptions of these two models 
will be developed more fully in the next chapter, a short 
discussion is necessary here in order to introduce the 
concepts I will use later.
According to critical theorist Jurgen Habermas, 
instrumental rationality is the way of knowing that has 
assumed cultural hegemony in Western, capitalist societies 
and is a source of "unfreedom. "2 Habermas delineates three 
categories of knowledge: empirical-analytical, interpretive 
insight, and emancipatory. Emancipatory knowledge, which 
empowers people through a process of self-reflection to free 
themselves from false consciousness, prejudice, and harmful 
ideologies, includes interpretive and emancipatory 
knowledge.3 Emancipatory and interpretive knowledge require 
a discursive, dialogic process. But the traditional model of 
environmental decision making is based on instrumentalism 
and logical positivism, or to use Yankelovich' s term, 
"objectivism." Decisions are often made by individual 
decision makers, typically risk professionals, within the 
bureaucratic setting, outside the purview of the public.4
Mary Timney Bailey argues when traditional theories and 
administrative practices no longer reflect the way the world 
is, old methods and models of decision making no longer 
apply. The liberal political assumptions of separation and
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individualism, of instrumental rationality and hierarchy, of 
welfare capitalism and the free market are outdated in the 
world we inhabit today.5 While these assumptions may have 
been useful during the earlier part of the century, they no 
longer reflect the way the world operates.
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL AND ITS CRITICS
The traditional model is flawed for a number of
reasons. First of all, the traditional model assumes the
organizational and institutional structures are not
problematic. However, Iris Young argues that organizational
structures can reinforce oppressive practices by overtly or
covertly denying access to some citizens. Issues of power
and access need to be analyzed as possible sources of
exclusion. Young asserts that possibilities for questioning
the underlying social and institutional structures that
cause inaccessibility should be a part of the policy process
when making distributive decisions. This shifts the focus of
analysis from the outcome of distributive decisions to "the
procedural issues of participation and deliberation and
decision making."6
One of the assumptions that underlies organizations
that adhere to the traditional model is that truth can be
scientifically derived.7 Bailey argues that
although science claims to be objective, the Rational 
Model, in fact, assumes the existence of a set of 
universal values, derived from the cultural norms of a 
homogeneous, middle-class European society. The values
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determine the acceptability of solutions to problems 
that have been defined in terms of the values. .. .For 
maximum efficiency, the model also demands an elite 
model of politics and administration...Pluralism, which 
implies deviation from elitist cultural norms, can be 
tolerated only to the extent that it can be 
controlled.8
Second, the traditional model assumes that experts make 
the best decisions because of their access to technical 
knowledge. Fiorino counters claims that the traditional 
model is preferable by arguing that citizens' judgments 
about risks are often as sound, if not more sound, than 
those of experts.9 The traditional model undermines 
democratic principles because decisions are typically made 
by individual decision makers without involving the public 
in the decision making process.
Third, the assumption that problems occur in isolation 
and can be solved without considering the context in which 
they occur is problematic if we accept the premise that all 
problems are interconnected. A fundamental law of ecology is 
that all life is interconnected. If this is true, then 
problems do not occur in isolation.
Both Bailey and Fiorino conclude that traditional 
models of decision making are inadequate because the 
assumptions are outdated. However, these assumptions 
continue inform the traditional decision making model 
institutionalized in government agencies, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency.
Although the problem is not specifically a problem of
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participation, by placing hazardous waste dumps in low- 
income neighborhoods citizens often conclude that 
environmental policies are not legitimate because they 
protect the interests of corporations and not the general 
public.10 Hazardous waste facilities are often placed out of 
sight of the white, voting, middle-class. This contributes 
to the perception that public participation programs are 
simply pro forma, public relations "shows" and not real 
opportunities for involvement in the policy process.11
Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas argues that when the 
legitimacy of the regulatory apparatus is threatened, the 
potential for a legitimation crisis is established.12 
If Habermas's analysis is correct, then public participation 
programs may be used as political tools to create an 
illusion of fairness, justice, and equality to prevent the 
public from pulling support from the State1s regulatory 
apparatus. If we apply this theory to hazardous waste siting 
decisions we can speculate that public participation 
mechanisms may support the interests of the capitalist class 
while disproportionately burdening members of the lower 
class. If this application is correct, then current public 
participation programs may not provide citizens with a 
meaningful, "real" opportunity to participate in the 
decision process. If this is true, then the process used to 
site the Emelle facility may have been pro forma.
A complete analysis of the traditional decision making
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requires an analysis of the procedures used to make
decisions. Young argues that
decision making issues include not only questions 
of who, by virtue of their positions have the 
effective freedom or authority to make what 
decisions, but also the rules and procedures 
according to which decisions are made.13
In the next section I review the procedures for including 
the public in the environmental decision making process. 
Following the review, I analyze the guidelines for 
structural barriers to participation and argue that 
structural barriers to participation exist because of 
implicit class bias.
Review of Public Participation Guidelines 
Covered Activities
Guidelines for public participation programs are 
outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations. Activities that 
must be open to the public include the issuance of permits 
for the operation of hazardous waste treatment and disposal 
facilities, permit enforcement, and rulemaking. Government 
agencies at the federal, state, interstate and substate 
levels are required to develop programs that "encourage and 
assist the participation of the public."14
Definition of the Public
The public is defined as "the people as a whole"15 in 
keeping with the spirit of NEPA as "a people's policy."
55
Specific segments of the population are identified "which 
may have a particular interest in a given program or 
decision.1,16 This includes private citizens affected by a 
decision as well as members of associations, organizations, 
professional societies, civic organizations, public 
officials, and governmental and educational associations.17
Definition Of Public Participation
Public participation is defined as
that part of the decision-making process 
through which responsible officials become 
aware of public attitudes by providing arrple 
opportunities for interested and affected 
parties to communicate their views. Public 
participation includes providing access to 
the decision-making process, seeking input 
from and conducting dialogue with the public, 
assimilating public viewpoints and 
preferences, and demonstrating that those 
preferences have been considered by the 
decision-making official. Disagreement on 
significant issues is to be expected among 
government agencies and the diverse groups 
interested in and affected by public policy 
issues. Public agencies should encourage full 
presentation of issues at an early stage so 
that they can be resolved and timely 
decisions can be made. In the course of this 
process, responsible officials should make 
special efforts to encourage and assist 
participation by citizens representing 
themselves and by others whose resources and 
access to decision-making may be relatively 
limited.18
Policy Objectives
The specific objectives for the implementation of 
public participation programs are outlined in §23.3(c) and
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recapitulate many of the key concepts outlined in the policy 
section of §25.3(b). The seven objectives listed are:
(1) To assure that the public has the opportunity to 
understand official programs and proposed actions, and that 
the government fully considers the public's concern.
(2) To assure that the government does not make any 
significant decision on any activity covered by this part 
without consulting interested and affected segments of the 
public.
(3) To assure that government action is as responsive 
as possible to public concerns.
(4) To encourage public involvement in implementing 
environmental laws.
(5) To keep the public informed about significant 
issues and proposed project or program changes as they 
arise.
(6) To foster a spirit of openness and mutual trust 
among EPA, States, substate agencies, and the public.
(7) To use all feasible means to create opportunities 
for public participation and to stimulate and support 
participation.
Minimum Requirements
§25.4 outlines the minimum requirements for EPA, State, 
interstate, and substate agencies in the development of 
public participation programs. Subsection (a) clearly 
specifies that conducting a public information and 
participation program is required. Subsection (b) outlines 
the "information, notification, and consultation 
responsibilities" required by EPA, State, interstate, or 
substate agencies responsible for implementing public 
participation programs.
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Informational Activities
Agencies are responsible for designing "informational 
activities to encourage and facilitate the public's 
participation in all significant decisions outlined in §25.2 
(a) . "19 It is incumbent upon the agency to provide the 
public with "continuing policy, program, and technical 
information and assistance" as early as possible in the 
decision process. Furthermore, "the social, economic, and 
environmental consequences" of an action should be 
communicated to the public in informational materials.
Section §25.4(b)3 addresses the availability of plans, 
reports, and documents relating to the decision making 
process. In order to make information available to the 
public, the guidelines indicate that an "agency shall 
provide one or more central collections" of pertinent 
documents. Furthermore, copying facilities should be located 
on the premises where the documents are kept. Sensitivity to 
the cost of copying materials is mentioned in this section. 
Copying should be made available at a "reasonable" cost.
§25.4(b)4 explicitly addresses the issue of copying 
costs. Agencies are required, when possible, to "provide 
copies of documents of interest to the public free of 
charge."20 This requirement is consistent with the 
requirements of §25.3(b) which encourages officials to make 
special efforts to accommodate citizens whose income and 
access to the decision-making process may be limited.
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Notification Requirements
Agencies are required to maintain a mailing list of 
"persons and organizations who have expressed an interest 
in, or may, by the nature of their purposes, activities, or 
members, be affected by or have an interest in any covered 
activity. "21
Public notification requirements are covered in 
§25.4(c). Agencies are required to notify both "interested 
affected parties and the media in advance of times at which 
major decisions not covered by notice requirements for 
public meetings and public hearings are being considered."22
Notices should be distributed well in advance of the 
proposed agency action in order to allow a minimum of thirty 
days for public response. Notices must include the timetable 
for a decision, the salient issues involved, the applicable 
laws and/or regulations under consideration or which have 
bearing on the matter, the location of documents, and the 
name of an agency representative to contact for further 
information. Additionally, any other relevant public 
involvement opportunities must be listed as well.23
Notices for public hearings, however, must be 
distributed forty five days prior to the scheduled date of a 
hearing unless it is determined by EPA that "there are no 
substantial documents which must be reviewed for effective 
hearing participation and that there are no complex or 
controversial matters to be addressed by the hearing."24
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Public Consultation Mechanisms
The term "public consultation" is defined in §25.4(d) 
as "an exchange of views between governmental agencies and 
interested or affected persons and organizations.1,25 Three 
approaches to public consultation are listed" public 
meetings, public hearings, and advisory groups. These three 
types of public consultation are considered "formal" 
mechanisms. §25.5 defines a hearing as "any non­
adjudicatory" meeting. §25.6 defines public meetings as "any 
assemblies or gatherings, (such as conferences, 
informational seminars, workshops, or other activities) 
which are open to the public."
A crucial component of the public consultation 
mechanism is the "timely distribution of information." The 
guidelines specify that distribution must occur well in 
advance of decision-making in order "to allow the agency to 
assimilate public views into agency actions."26 Furthermore, 
an agency is required to hold a meeting or hearing if it 
"determines that there is significant public interest or 
that a hearing or meeting would be useful.1,27 
§25.5(c) requires that "hearings must be held at times and 
places which facilitate attendance by the public."
Particular consideration should be given to evening and 
weekends, access to public transportation, and multi-site 
meetings if the action affects a large region.
Witnesses should be scheduled before the hearing,
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according to §25.5(d), in order to effectively utilize the 
time allotted for all speakers. However, the guidelines 
specify that time should be left for unscheduled testimony, 
such as questions and answers. This should provide an 
opportunity for unscheduled witnesses to come forward during 
the hearing, as well as facilitate public discussion.
Hearings should be conducted in a way that does not 
"unduly inhibit free expression of views.1,28 It is incumbent 
on the agency to inform those in attendance of the issues 
involved, the considerations the agency will make regarding 
the decision, the tentative decision made by the agency 
prior to the hearing, and the particular information 
solicited from the public.29
The final formal mechanism available to agencies for 
facilitating public participation is advisory groups. 
Advisory groups "are intended to assist elected officials or 
appointed officials with final decision-making...on 
important issues and foster a constructive interchange among 
various interests present in the group, and enhance the 
prospect of community acceptance of agency action."30 The 
advisory group should consist "of substantially equivalent 
proportions of (1) private citizens, (2) representatives of 
public interest groups, (3) public officials, and (4) 
citizens or representatives of organizations with 
substantial economic interests in the plan or project."31
The agency is responsible for identifying members of
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the groups listed above for possible membership on the 
advisory committee. "Active efforts" to inform citizens and 
members of various interest groups are required by the 
agency. This may include a variety of outreach efforts, 
including contacting individuals and organizations 
directly.32
However, if the agency is unable to fairly balance 
representation on the advisory committee it must "identify 
the causative problem and make additional efforts to 
overcome such problems," even if it requires making 
"personal contact with prospective participants to invite 
their participation.1,33 If an agency cannot meet the 
requirements for membership, it is required to contact EPA 
for assistance. Furthermore, a list of all advisory group 
members must be made available to EPA and the public. It is 
incumbent on the agency to provide, as well, a list of its 
efforts to comply with the membership requirements. 
Additionally, an explanation of the problems which prevented 
compliance is required by EPA.34
Less formal public consultation mechanisms include 
"review groups, ad hoc committees, task forces, workshops, 
seminars and informal personal communications with 
individuals and groups."35
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ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDELINES 
The Definition Of Public Participation
The public participation process is defined as 
"providing access to the decision-making process, seeking 
input from and conducting dialogue with the public." Access 
denotes having an opportunity to participate. Since access 
involves the time and location of meetings some citizens may 
be barred from participating by scheduling conflicts. If a 
community or neighborhood is low-income or working class a 
meeting held during working hours may prevent many people 
from participating. Working class and hourly wage earners do 
not have the same privileges as white collar professionals 
who have more control over their working hours. Blue collar 
workers typically cannot take time off from work for 
political involvement unless they use sick or 'vacation time. 
Low-income mothers may need child care in order to 
participate. Furthermore, transportation may be an issue, 
especially for residents in rural communities.
Although these may seem to be minor points I believe 
they may inhibit participation because of an implicit class 
bias. Rosenstone and Hansen argue that " [p]eople who are 
educated, efficacious, and socially involved take part in 
the activities of government more often than others."36 This 
occurs, in part, because better educated individuals have 
access to resources that are necessary for participation in 
political and public affairs. Rosenstone and Hansen define
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resources as money, time, knowledge, skill, and self- 
confidence. Access includes time, location, and the economic 
resources necessary to enable participation. Because 
affluent individuals are in a position to hire others to 
care for their children, clean their houses, and attend to 
other details of daily life, they may have more time to 
participate in public meetings. Poor individuals, on the 
other hand, do not have the same luxury of time because they 
are struggling to survive. Thus, a lack of material 
resources may prohibit lower income persons from 
part i c ipat ing.
Although the guidelines state "responsible officials 
should make special efforts to encourage and assist 
participation by citizens representing themselves and others 
whose resources and access may be relatively limited" this 
does not guarantee low income persons will be given 
assistance to participate. First of all, this statement puts 
the burden for providing assistance on responsible 
officials. Not all officials are responsible. Second,
"should" is a normative statement, not a requirement. Third, 
during the Reagan administration funds to states for public 
participation programs were cut which indicates 
participation programs are subject to partisan control.37 
And finally, special efforts are not defined.
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The People As The Public
Although the guidelines define the public as the 
"people as a whole," certain populations are explicitly- 
identified as potentially having a special interest in 
specific programs or decisions. This includes private 
citizens as well as members of professional and civic 
organizations, government agencies and educational 
institutions, and elected officials.
While it is true that some groups may be more 
interested in participating because of an increased sense of 
political efficacy, there appears to be an inplicit class 
bias in this requirement which may prevent low income, 
racial minorities, and women from participating. By making 
special efforts to involve established environmental groups, 
civic associations, and professional groups, low income 
citizens may be excluded. Direct outreach to individuals and 
organizations may result in over-representation of white, 
middle class individuals either in public meetings, 
hearings, or advisory groups.
Active involvement in voluntary organizations and 
associations promotes political activism38. Low income 
people are generally under represented in professional and 
civic organizations and associations, including the 
traditional environmental groups. Research indicates that 
membership in mainstream environmental groups is primarily 
white and middle class. 39 This is because many minorities
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and low income citizens often prefer local, grassroots 
movements organized around environmental justice issues.40 
Because of the frustration experienced by grassroots 
activists in their attempts to communicate with officials, 
many low-income women develop alternative policy processes 
based on principles of participatory democracy and inclusive 
strategies.41
Dialogue and the Decision Making Official
Public participation includes "seeking input from and 
conducting dialogue with the public... assimilating public 
viewpoints and preferences, and demonstrating that those 
preferences have been considered by the decision-making 
official." There are several key issues contained in this 
statement that need further analysis. First, the term 
"dialogue" deserves further consideration. Dialogue is a 
process of communication, usually a conversation, where 
"ideas and opinions are exchanged in order to reach an 
amicable or agreeable settlement. 42
According to this definition dialogue assumes a non- 
adversarial process. Implicit in this definition is the 
assumption that parties involved in a dialogue will engage 
in the process with the intention of reaching agreement. 
However, the guidelines state that "[d] isagreement on 
significant issues is to be expected among government 
agencies and the diverse groups interested in and affected
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by public policy issues." Because this model is founded on 
the assumption that disagreement can be expected, the 
process is implicitly informed by "a competitive model that 
locates the authority in the rational process of 
individuals."43 This contradicts the definition of dialogue 
which assumes a non-adversarial process. Basing procedures 
on the adversarial argumentative style as the preferred mode 
of public discussion may prevent "tacit and more grounded 
forms of knowledge" from emerging in the policy process.44 
This point is important because this may constitute a form 
of domination which may inhibit the expression of 
emancipatory knowledge. Some cultural groups prefer 
narrative or storytelling as ways of conveying knowledge 
instead of argumentative and confrontational styles.45
Typically low-income women represent the community 
while middle class white men represent government and 
industry. William Freudenburg and Susan Pastor suggest that 
"unseen assumptions about masculinity and femininity may 
play an important part in NIMBY/LULU debates."46 They argue 
that local leaders of grassroots groups who are usually 
women are often perceived as "irrational, emotional, or ill- 
informed" by government and industry officials.
Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen argue that gender, 
race, and language may impede political participation.47 
Women and Blacks often experience an "ascriptive barrier" 
when attempting to communicate with white, male public
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officials.48 This may reflect "implicit stereotyping" by 
"policy spokesperson and scientists" who are "overwhelmingly 
men.1,49
Although the guidelines require that hearings be 
conducted in a manner that is conducive to public 
participation, hearings and public meetings can be 
intimidating to some women and racial minorities because of 
inplicit stereotyping and the "ascriptive barrier" described 
above. Typically witnesses come forward and address a panel 
of officials from a podium with a microphone in a large room 
full of people. For someone who has never experienced this 
type of public presentation, or who lacks the self 
confidence necessary to present their point of view, the 
hearing may present a formidable obstacle to participation.
The way in which a meeting or hearing is structured 
(formal vs. informal) and the leadership style of the 
facilitator may impact the participation process. While the 
guidelines specify that meetings should not be conducted in 
a way to inhibit the free expression of views and values, 
the process may implicitly inhibit citizen's voices.
Facilitators may enhance or inhibit participation 
depending on the manner they use to conduct meetings or 
hearings. The use of a dialogic, narrative style instead of 
an argumentative, adversarial style may enhance 
participation and facilitate the discussion of public 
values.
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Furthermore, dialogue assumes that people have the 
necessary skills to engage in public deliberation. Because 
these skills are usually refined through the process of 
higher education, many low income people do not have the 
requisite thinking and verbal skills to effectively 
participate in public discussion. Thus, opportunities for 
enhancing citizen's political capacities should be a primary 
corrponent of an environmental justice strategy.50
Another aspect of access involves the assumption that 
most people are literate and speak English. A California 
court recently ruled that many Hispanic residents of 
Kettleman, California were denied access to the public 
participation process under RCRA because public officials 
failed to translate documents into Spanish.51
Finally, the guidelines imply that the "decision maker" 
has the final say on what decision will be implemented. 
Although the public should have an opportunity to have input 
into the decision process, express their preferences and 
views, the ultimate authority rests with the decision maker. 
Typically the decision maker is the government official 
responsible for state or federal environmental protection 
agencies.
This is problematic for two reasons. First of all, by 
relying on an individual decision maker who must assimilate 
and demonstrate s/he has considered public preferences, a 
power differential exists between the decision making
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official and the public. The decision maker, although 
informed by the public, appears to act autonomously in the 
final analysis when determining which decision is best. By 
relying on an individual decision maker to make the best 
decision, the guidelines assume that the liberal political 
ideals of autonomy, independence, and separation are 
normative. These assumptions will be more fully explored in 
the next chapter.
Second, most environmental decisions are based on some 
variant of positivist theory. Positivism is anti-democratic 
because of the implicit assumption that once the individual 
analyst or decision maker discovers and knows the facts 
about the environment, "decisions will be almost 
automatic."52 If this is true, then public participation 
mechanisms may not be intended as truly public deliberative 
processes, but rather public relations events to maintain 
loyalty to the State to avert a mass uprising.
Political Capacity
According to political scientists Steven Rosenstone and 
John Hansen, and sociologist Robert Bullard, personal 
competence (or self-confidence) is a key determinant in 
political participation. Because members of marginalized 
groups, especially women, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
members of lower economic classes often suffer from 
"internalized oppression,1,53 the probability of public
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involvement is less than for those individuals who have a
sense of personal competence.
Berry, Portney, and Thomsen concur with this conclusion
but expand the definition of efficacy to include a notion
they call "capacity." Political capacity is defined as "the
overall ability of an individual to take part in the
political process."54 While efficacy usually implies a form
of political self-esteem, capacity involves a broader range
of dimensions than traditional theories of efficacy. These
dimensions include
a practical dimension (the knowledge to know 
how to participate), a psychological 
dimension (the belief that one can influence 
the system), and an experiential dimension 
(the drawing of lessons from activity in 
politics that makes one believe it is worth 
participating) .55
Citizens need to know how to participate, know that 
their participation matters, and know about their 
participation by experiencing the process. However, not all 
citizens have the practical knowledge to know how to access 
the participation process, or have the self-confidence to 
know that their participation can make a difference. Without 
the requisite practical knowledge, citizens cannot gain 
knowledge about the worth of their experience. Thus, 
material barriers may seriously inpact political capacity.
Berry, Portney, and Thomsen conclude that participation 
in face-to-face participation activities is positively 
correlated with increased knowledge about how to access
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government services. Furthermore, as citizens develop a 
sense of empowerment in the psychological dimension, they 
are more likely to participate in face-to-face political 
activity. This sense of empowerment increases citizen's 
beliefs about their own effectiveness in influencing local 
government. However, the authors conclude that increases in 
political capacity are more pronounced, especially for lower 
socio-economic individuals, when a participation program is 
part of a citywide context.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed the challenge of 
citizen participation by analyzing the guidelines for public 
participation programs in hazardous waste policy. I have 
argued that material/structural barriers may prevent many 
low-income and women from participating in the policy 
process. While procedural reform may alleviate some of the 
barriers to participation, this conclusion is tentatively 
advanced. The solution to the citizen participation 
challenge may require an emancipatory decision making 
process that incorporates other forms of knowledge, 
including emancipatory and interpretive knowledge. This 
knowledge, however, should not supplant scientific/analytic 
knowledge. In the next chapter I explore the epistemological 
challenge.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
Beyond defining environmentalism in a more inclusive 
way, emancipatory environmentalism brings epistemological 
issues to the forefront for critical analysis. Therefore, an 
analysis of the traditional and emancipatory environmental 
paradigms would be incomplete without uncovering their 
epistemological foundations. In this chapter I address the 
epistemological challenge, and argue that alternative forms 
of knowledge should be included in the decision making 
process. I discuss postmodern theories of alternative 
"epistemes," critiques of science, and discuss objectivist 
and standpoint epistemological and moral theories. I argue 
that the disinterested, detached position knowers assume in 
objectivist epistemology is similar to the moral standpoint 
required by Kantian ethics. This position may cause morally 
exclusive thinking. In contrast to the objectivist 
standpoint, feminist theorists have developed an alternative 
epistemological theory called "standpoint epistemology." I 
discuss standpoint epistemology and alternative moral 
theories.
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The Epistemological Barrier
An "epistemological barrier" exists between experts and
the lay public that prevents many citizens from
participating in the decision making process.1 One of the
consequences of this epistemological barrier is that many
citizens develop a distrust of experts.2 Many hazardous
waste siting controversies have been exacerbated by the
seeming inability of experts to bridge the gap between their
specialized scientific/technological knowledge and other
forms of knowledge. These other forms of knowledge include
what Michael Foucault calls "subjugated knowledges."3
Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocks 
of historical knowledge which were present 
but disguised within the body of 
functionalist and systematizing theory and 
which criticism - which obviously draws upon 
scholarship - has been able to reveal.4
In addition, Foucault argues that these knowledges have been
placed low on the hierarchy of knowledge and disqualified as
legitimate. He calls these subjugated knowledges "popular
knowledge" which are not to be confused with common sense.
Instead, subjugated knowledges represent "a particular,
local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge
incapable of unanimity.1,5
Numerous scholars describe the dominant epistemology,
or "episteme" as objectivist, technicist,
technical/analytical and technocratic.6 Despite the
dominance of this epistemology other forms of knowledge,
including the subjugated knowledges described by Foucault
and the interpretive and emancipatory forms of knowledge
discussed by Habermas, exist as alternative epistemes. These
"alternative epistemes are a possible source of escape from
domination.1,7 But as Foucault notes, they may be uncovered
through a process of deconstructing accepted ways of
knowing. In the case of environmental policy, this involves
a deconstruction of the objectivist/technicist episteme.
This does not mean scientific and technical knowledge is not
important in the hazardous waste policy process. The point
is that we should integrate other forms of knowledge into to
the decision matrix. Other ways of knowing include
interpretive and emancipatory knowledge including values,
conceptions of justice, ethics, and other non-verifiable
ways of knowing.8 Thus, the incorporation of alternative
forms of knowledge may provide the balance of technical and
value concerns intended by the authors of NEPA.
Benjamin Goldman supports this conclusion and argues
that environmental injustice is caused, in part, by the
limits of scientific positivism. In a report prepared for
the National Wildlife Federation, Goldman makes states his
conclusion clearly:
[c] oncem for environmental justice means 
that the kinds of scientific data and 
uncertainty involved in all types of 
environmental analysis must be viewed within 
the context of varying perceptions and 
values. While traditional scientific methods 
strive for objective results that can pass 
accepted standards of scientific proof, the
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goals of fairness and justice that are 
demanded by environmental justice advocates 
are inherently subjective, multifaceted, and 
vary from case to case. This challenge to 
scientific positivism is part of the long­
term trend of increasingly widespread public 
distrust of scientific and institutional 
authority.9
Goldman argues that the problem cannot be remedied by 
the current risk methodologies used by EPA. This is because 
traditional scientific positivism separates facts from 
values. Facts are considered knowledge while values and 
judgments are not. As we saw in Chapter Two, community 
residents often discuss values while technical experts 
discuss facts. What Goldman recognizes is that environmental 
justice requires an alternative form of decision making that 
can accommodate public deliberation about justice and 
equity. In the next section we shall see that the 
traditional rational decision model is limited in it's 
ability to accommodate concerns about justice.
Research methodologies that exclude explicit values 
discussions, argues Beverly Wright, cause many community 
residents to conclude that experts and researchers cannot be 
trusted because they fail to establish "a human relationship 
with their study group. "10 Wright assumes that the 
discussion of values may strengthen the expert-citizen 
relationship. Margot Garcia supports this conclusion by 
stating that "[b] uilding support comes from understanding 
the local community and responding to their world view."11 
In order to build bridges between scientific expertise and
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subjugated knowledges, Wright concludes "[w]e must foster 
mutual respect for different ways of knowing."12 If Wright's 
conclusion is correct, then fostering respect for different 
ways of knowing and developing inclusive strategies in 
environmental decision making should be a priority for EPA. 
Before inclusive strategies can be developed, however, the 
underlying ethical and epistemological assumptions of 
objectivism and standpoint theories will be critically 
examined.
Objectivist Epistemology
Daniel Yankelovich, author of Coming to Public 
Judgment. argues that a Culture of Technical Control 
dominates the public realm, thus "undermining the country's 
ability to reach agreement between the public and experts on 
the serious problems that beset society.1,13 The Culture of 
Technical Control, according to Yankelovich, operates from 
many assumptions. While these assumptions are too lengthy to 
list here, several are relevant to the discussion and will 
be mentioned.
These assumptions are as follows: policy decisions 
require a high degree of specialized knowledge and skill. 
Only experts possess this knowledge. The American public 
lacks the relevant knowledge to participate in policy 
decisions and are concerned with economic self-interest, if 
they are interested at all. On issues that require public
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involvement, such as hazardous waste and other environmental 
issues, it is assumed that "public education" programs can 
facilitate public understanding.14
Yankelovich argues that the objectivist epistemology is 
the dominant episteme in the Culture of Technical Control. 
One of the characteristics of objectivist epistemology is 
the separation of facts from values. Facts are considered 
genuine knowledge while value judgments are considered 
emotional responses to conditions of life that cannot be 
verified as truths. To count as objective knowledge, claims 
must be verifiable by scientific methods. It is not possible 
to establish the truth validity of a -value judgment.15 
Emotions and values have long been considered subversive in 
the Western tradition and associated with women and members 
of non-dominant groups.16
Values and emotions are considered invalid ways of 
knowing within the dominant epistemological paradigm based 
on rationalism (pure reason and logic) and empiricism 
(observation by experience). One of the key differences 
between rationalist and empiricist epistemologies is in the 
function and value of the deductive as opposed to the 
inductive inferential process. Within the rationalist 
epistemological paradigm knowledge is constructed using 
principles of formal logic and mathematics, from first 
principles which are known to be true a priori, or before 
experience. Formal logic and mathematics are deductive.
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Thus, if the premises are true the conclusion has to be 
true. Deductive arguments are valid arguments.
Inductive arguments are considered cogent if the 
premises are acceptable. Inductive arguments require that 
judgment be exercised in the inferential process. The 
premises are carefully evaluated and weighed globally 
against other knowledge claims. The inductive process is a 
deliberative process of evaluating and questioning premises.
It is at this point in the inferential process that 
judgment is exercised. One of the assumptions of the Culture 
of Technical Control is that citizens do not have the 
required knowledge to participate in policy decisions. While 
it may be true that citizens do not have access to the same 
facts as experts, if values were considered valid knowledge, 
then the conclusion that citizens do not have adequate 
knowledge to participate in the decision making process 
would be invalid.
Value judgments, however, cannot be verified through 
"intersubjective verifiability, 1,17 a key requirement of 
objectivism. This aspect of objectivity specifies that one 
can obtain more evidence for a statement and, hence put the 
claim on more solid epistemological ground by asking others 
what they observe and experience under conditions similar to 
the conditions under which the original observation is made. 
If an observer observes the same set of premises as the 
original observer, then those observations should lead to
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the same conclusion. Since value neutrality fulfills one of 
the aspects of objectivity within the objectivist paradigm, 
it is assumed that evaluation of premises does not occur in 
the inferential process since all premises lead to the same 
conclusion if we accept them as verifiable, hence empirical 
facts. But the inferential process is not value free. The 
very process of accepting some premises and rejecting others 
involves making value judgments.
Reason and emotions, mind and body, facts and values, 
public and private, theory and practice are separated into 
two distinct realms within the modem worldview that informs 
the traditional decision making model.18 This theory 
provides the foundations for the epistemological assumptions 
of positivism and neo-positivism that inform liberal 
political theory.19 Basic to liberal political philosophy is 
the assumption that human beings are morally and 
epistemologically separate from one another.20 Within 
liberalism it is assumed that humans make moral decisions 
and create knowledge as separate and autonomous individuals. 
This assumption influences both epistemological and moral 
standpoints and may not seem problematic if we accept the 
basic premises of separation and autonomy as normative. But 
if we question the validity of separation and autonomy as 
normative moral and epistemological standpoints, the 
objectivist paradigm begins to crumble.
The detached standpoint required by objectivist
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epistemology shares many similarities with the objectivist 
standpoint found in the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant.
In the next section, I discuss the objective moral 
standpoint.
Kant and the Objective Standpoint
Kant1s ethical theory of the categorical imperative 
provides the basis for deonotological, or rule-based ethics. 
In A Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant argues 
that an objective standpoint is necessary in developing 
moral principles. Ethics, according to Kant, cannot be based 
on emotions because of their subjective contingency. 
Autonomous reason, according to Kant, provides a basis for 
supreme morality. Kant calls objective principles "commands 
of reason" and their formulas imperatives. An imperative can 
command hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical 
imperatives guide actions that lead a desired end. 
Categorical imperatives are universal commands that guide 
actions that are morally necessary irrespective of one's 
goals or desired ends. According to this theory, moral 
decisions should be made "as if" whatever moral decision we 
make would become a universal law. Thus, Kant's theory is a 
universalizing theory that strives for moral absolutes.21
There are several problems with Kant's theory. First of 
all, the standpoint from which the moral agent makes moral 
decisions is free from the context of particular historical,
social, and cultural conditions. Thus, this objectivist 
standpoint requires that principles guiding moral and 
ethical decision making be developed from an impartial point 
outside the social context. This is often referred to as the 
"Archimedean standpoint" which is the goal of positivism and 
deonotological moral theory. The assumption here is that all 
individuals will reason from the same standpoint. Thus, 
Kantian morality assumes moral reasoning occurs from an 
abstract, impartial standpoint free from the particular and 
subjective contingencies of social and historical context.
The second area where Kant's theory is problematic is 
with the role of feelings and emotions in moral decision 
making. Kant believes human feelings are inferior to reason 
because feelings are subjectively contingent. Kant argues 
that emotions belong to the sensible world while reason 
belongs to the intelligible world. Emotions allow us to 
"know objects only as they affect ourselves. "22Thus, 
feelings allow us to know how things appear, not as they are 
as things in themselves. Implicit in this statement is that 
emotions cannot be considered valid knowledge.
Freedom, according to Kant, can only come from being 
independent of the vagaries of the sensible world which 
includes feelings and emotions. Freedom is thus associated 
with reason. Because emotions and feelings are variable, 
they cannot be verified and are not considered valid grounds 
for making moral decisions. According to Kant, moral
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decisions are made by reasoning.
The objective moral standpoint required by Kantian 
ethics has been considered normative by social 
psychologists. Lawrence Kohlberg concluded that the 
disinterested standpoint was normative after conducting 
research on the moral development of male college students 
at Harvard. Kohlberg argued that the highest stage of moral 
development occurs when a moral agent makes decisions 
according to a set of rules. This moral standpoint assumes 
the moral agent is autonomous and impartial, not subject to 
the influences of emotions, values, or subjectively 
contingent conditions.23 The moral actor applies universal 
rules without any consideration of the nuances of the 
situation. As we saw earlier, Goldman argues that a 
requirement of environmental justice is that the decision 
making process be a subjective and multi-varied process.
This requires a different moral and epistemological 
standpoint than that required by objectivist epistemology 
and deontological ethics.
The problem, however, is not with the standpoints, per 
se, but with the fact that they are considered normative. 
Women and people of color often make moral decisions and 
create knowledge from another standpoint, as we shall see in 
the next section.
87
Standpoint Epistemology
Feminist theories of standpoint epistemology are 
premised on the belief that knowledge is socially 
constructed and is informed by one's position in society.24 
According to this theory, gender, social class, everyday 
experience, and history influence knowledge construction. 
This theory of knowledge is influenced by Marx's theory of 
historical materialism. Standpoint theory posits that 
everyday experiences have political consequences.
The premises of standpoint epistemology are:
1. One's material life structures and limits 
one's understanding of life.
2. Members of more powerful and less 
powerful groups will potentially have 
inverted or opposed understandings of the 
world.
3. Dominant group view will be 'partial 
and perverse' in contrast to the subordinate 
groups view, which is potentially more 
complete.
4. Less powerful groups standpoint has 
to be developed through education, presumably 
consciousness raising, or the disadvantaged 
are likely to accept their society's dominant 
worldview.25
The development of "conscientizagao" or critical 
consciousness is an important aspect of standpoint theory.26 
From a critically conscious standpoint, an individual can 
perceive contradictions inherent in political, social, and 
economic relationships. If Foucault is correct, the presence 
of subjugated knowledges emerge through the process of 
critical social analysis. Because knowledge is created 
through experiences that are shaped by social, cultural, and
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political institutions, the knowledge that comes from one's 
standpoint is potentially emancipatory knowledge. The 
purpose of emancipatory knowledge, according to Habermas, is 
"to make people free, to emancipate them mentally from false 
forms of consciousness, ideology, prejudices, and mental 
coercion."27 This "critical consciousness" occurs at a point 
of epistemological development called "constructed 
knowing.1,28
Research by feminist psychologists indicate that this 
epistemological standpoint is significant for women for 
several reasons. Questioning and problem solving are 
integral components of knowledge development at this point 
because knowers at this stage of epistemological development 
often question the status quo and develop radical political 
critiques of social conditions.29 Research by Celene Krauss 
and Andrew Szasz indicates that women who become involved in 
toxic struggles are often politically transformed by their 
experiences.
At the position of constructed knowing, knowers move 
beyond "either/or" or exclusionary thinking. Thinking 
exclusively can lead to exclusive actions. Exclusive 
thinking has political consequences because' it can lead to 
incoirplete social analysis resulting in poor social policy 
"that reproduces, rather than solves, social problems."30 
By "shifting the center" of knowledge from the perspective 
of dominant groups to oppressed groups our thinking is
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changed from being "exclusive" to "inclusive."
Exclusive thinking has moral as well as epistemological
consequences. Susan Opotow describes morally exclusive
actions as occurring "when individuals or groups are
perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values,
rules, and considerations of fairness apply.1,31 In contrast
to moral exclusion, she refers to moral inclusion as
occurring in
relationships in which the parties are 
approximately equal, the potential for 
reciprocity exists, and both parties are 
entitled to fair processes and some share of 
community resources.
Morally inclusive and exclusive thinking are important 
to this discussion because of the standpoint each position 
irrplies. A morally exclusive standpoint is one in which the 
knower assumes a disinterested or inpartial position, thus 
enabling him or her to exclude individuals, groups, or non­
human nature from moral consideration. This is the 
standpoint required by objectivist epistemology. By 
developing a moral boundary that excludes some groups from 
consideration, it is easier to implement unjust policies. 
Thus, the inpartial, disinterested epistemological and moral 
standpoint required by objectivist epistemology may actually 
be a requirement for success in an advanced capitalist 
society. If this is true, then this moral and 
epistemological standpoint is a social, historical, and 
cultural construction, not a universal condition of moral
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maturity. It may be normative, but it may not be normal.
Morally inclusive thinking requires reciprocity, 
equality, fairness, and connection. Moral decisions are thus 
made from a situated standpoint. In the next section I 
discuss the situated moral standpoint.
The Situated Moral Standpoint
Feminist moral philosophers and ethicists have raised 
several criticism of traditional ethical theories, including 
deontological ethics.32 Feminists question the norms of 
rationality, universality, impartiality, and abstraction. 
While there is much debate in feminist circles about what 
constitutes feminist ethics, it appears that generally 
feminists argue for a morality that values particularity, 
emotions, partiality, and actual vs. hypothetical 
situations.33 Emphasis is placed on our responsibilities to 
relationships instead of on the application of rules. Since 
relationships are valued, moral reasoning often takes place 
through a discursive, dialogic process which contrasts with 
the "monologic" moral reasoning required by Kantian 
ethics.34
Joan Tronto argues that since the eighteenth century 
the moral point of view has become a standpoint of 
"disinterested and disengaged moral actors.1,35 Prior to that 
time, the situated moral standpoint was once an integral 
part of community life. When the disinterested standpoint
became the norm, morality came to exist in an abstract world 
beyond home and community. Although local variations in 
moral decision making were once considered normative, as a 
consequence of the universalization of morality, Tronto 
argues, "local variations in moral decision-making were 
viewed as inferior to depersonalized rational thought."36 
Thus, the engaged, contextual moral standpoint, influenced 
by local knowledge, habits, and customs was replaced by a 
standpoint of the disengaged, depersonalized rationality of 
Kantian ethics. Tronto argues that the engaged, contextual 
moral standpoint has historically been found in those groups 
who care for, care about, and take care of others. The work 
of Cortese and Gilligan support her conclusion.
Caring is defined as "a species activity that includes 
everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair 'our 
world' so we can live in it as well as possible. That world 
includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment."37 
Caring work is divided along gender, racial, and socio­
economic lines. The context of caring work is informed by 
the feelings and emotions of those engaged in the caring 
activity. Thus, caring activity requires a situated 
standpoint. But since emotions are considered inferior to 
reason, the situated moral standpoint has been marginalized 
as well as the people who typically adopt this moral 
standpoint: women and people of color.
Critical theorist Jurgen Habermas has written
extensively on the role of discourse in moral reasoning. 
Habermas calls this "discursive ethics" and argues that 
"only in a discursive context can moral capacities develop 
fully.1,38 Because moral capacities develop more fully within 
a discursive context, Habermas proposes a seventh stage of 
moral development that goes beyond the Kantian stage of 
deontological ethics standpoint of moral reasoning from an 
abstract, unsituated position. Habermas proposes a seventh 
stage of moral development based on an "ideal speech 
situation" free from domination. Discursive ethics are 
dialogical and assume that discussions about needs and 
interests will take place by historically and socially 
situated individuals. The way in which values and 
assumptions are made explicit is through a discursive 
process in a situated, relational, context. Thus, Habermas's 
theory of a communicative ethic may foster morally inclusive 
thinking since morally inclusive thinking requires 
reciprocity, equality, and fairness which occurs in a 
relational context between individuals who are historically, 
socially, and culturally situated.
According to Lorraine Code, this epistemic context is 
best captured in a narrative style.39 The integration of 
emotions are integral because through the narrative process 
of telling our stories we come to understand others. If 
understanding is important in the facility siting process, 
as stated by the guidelines, then this may be best
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accomplished by a narrative process that incorporates 
interpretive and emancipatory knowledge. But both of these 
forms of knowledge assume a situated standpoint. Similar to 
the epistemological and moral standpoint of objectivism, the 
situated standpoint has both epistemological and moral 
implications.
Social psychologists working in the area of moral 
cognition provide support for Tronto's conclusion that a 
caring, connected moral standpoint is not, in fact, inferior 
to the Kantian standpoint. Carol Gilligan and Anthony 
Cortese discuss the importance of the contextual, relational 
approach to moral decision-making.
Gilligan discovered that a different moral voice often 
emerges when women make moral decisions. This "ethic of 
care" occurs within the context of relationships, in 
contrast to the inpersonal application of deontological or 
rule-based ethics. Because moral problems are problems of 
human relations, Gilligan concludes that "relationship 
requires connection" and "depends not only on the capacity 
or the ability to listen to others and learn their language 
or take their point of view, but also on having a voice and 
having a language."40 I believe Gilligan means women must 
feel free to speak the language of emotions.
As I argued in the last chapter, women are often 
frustrated in their attempts to communicate with technical 
experts. While women and people of color approach toxics
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issues from a perspective of care, experts approach the 
situation from a detached standpoint because this is 
considered the norm. Furthermore, experts often stereotype 
both women and people of color as emotional or hysterical. 
Consequently, the ability to understand the perspectives, 
interests, values, and world views of community members is 
truncated by the requirements of objectivism and 
stereotyping. As I noted earlier, overcoming this challenge 
requires building trust. Trust and justice require a 
relational, situated, and caring context for making 
decisions.
Cortese studied the moral decision-making of minority 
groups and argues that "relationships provide the context 
and basis for any type of justice, any code of moral 
principles for which we live."41 Although justice is 
something we may understand as a concept, it is through the 
practice of justice that we become moral. And Cortese 
concludes that "if we have no deep sense of relationship, we 
may have a conceptualization of the highest level of 
justice, but we will not be moral."42 If Cortese is correct, 
then environmental justice may require that we adopt a 
situated moral standpoint when making environmental 
decisions.
Conclusions
In this chapter I argued that the dominance of the
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objectivist epistemology and the Kantian moral standpoint 
present challenges which must be overcome if we are to 
achieve the goal of an environmentally just decision making 
process. By integrating the subjugated knowledges of local 
citizens into the decision making process in substantive 
ways, the epistemological challenge may be overcome. This 
may require more than mere procedural reform of the 
guidelines for public participation. While changing 
procedures may facilitate positive changes, other challenges 
must be met. In the next chapter, I discuss the public 
values challenge.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PUBLIC VALUES CHALLENGE: 
DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Although environmental justice is an important 
principle, recent debates between environmental justice 
advocates and EPA officials skirted philosophical 
discussion. Consequently, environmental justice has a 
variety of meanings depending on the context of discussion. 
The failure to explicitly discuss environmental justice may 
exacerbate the problem of environmental injustice because 
environmental justice has a variety of meanings depending on 
the context of discussion.
In this chapter I discuss the conceptions of justice 
that represent the EPA and environmental justice advocates.
I argue that the EPA position is informed by the objectivist 
moral and epistemological assuirptions discussed in the last 
chapter. The environmental justice position incorporates 
standpoint moral and epistemological theories. The best 
articulation of this position can be found in the Seventeen 
Principles of Environmental Justice.
First, I explore the history of the debates between EPA 
and environmental justice advocates. I then discuss the EPA 
position and argue that the Kantian-Rawlsian standpoint
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implicitly informs this position. Second, I discuss and 
analyze the Seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice.
The EPA Position
In January, 1990 a conference on race and the
environment was held at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. A coalition of scholar-activists, 'the Michigan
Coalition,1 emerged from the conference. The newly-formed
coalition sent memos to Louis Sullivan, Department of Health
and Human Services; William Reilly, Environmental Protection
Agency; and Michael Deland, Council on Environmental
Quality. The memos expressed concern over what the Coalition
viewed as disparate inpacts experienced by low-income and
minority communities in the placement of polluting
facilities. Other state and federal government officials
received copies of the memo, including the Congressional
Black Caucus.2 The Michigan Coalition requested meetings
with agency officials to discuss various dimensions of the
environmental problem.3
In response to the demands made by the Coalition, an
entire issue of the EPA Journal was devoted to the topic. In
the journal, William Reilly framed the issue as an
environmental equity issue.
environmental equity means fairness. It speaks to the 
impartiality that should guide the application of laws 
designed to protect the health of human beings and the 
productivity of ecological systems on which all human 
activity depends.4
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On September 13, 1991 members of the Michigan Coalition 
met with then EPA Administrator, William Reilly. The meeting 
was held in response to the memos sent to Reilly. In order 
to determine if the allegations of environmental racism made 
by the Coalition were valid, William Reilly formed "an 
internal workgroup to study and report to him on the issues 
raised at the Michigan conference."5
Comprised of forty professional EPA errployees, the 
purpose of the workgroup was to investigate the charges that 
EPA's rules were applied unfairly in certain communities and 
to make recommendations to Reilly on how to remedy the 
situation.6 The workgroup's report, Environmental Equity: 
Reducing Risk For All Communities, was released internally 
early in 1992. The public, however, did not have access to 
the report until June, 1992.
While the Environmental Equity report acknowledged that 
differences in exposure to environmental risks are real, the 
Workgroup attributed the differences to "historical patterns 
of commerce, geography, state and local land use decisions 
and other factors that affect where people live and work."7 
The group could find no irrefutable empirical evidence to 
support claims made by activists that minority communities 
were targeted for unwanted facilities. Instead of framing 
the issue as a justice issue, the Workgroup followed 
Reilly's definition of the problem as "equity."
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The rationale given for choosing the term "equity
instead of "justice" was
because it [environmental equity] most 
readily lends itself to scientific risk 
analysis. The distribution of environmental 
risks is often measurable and quantifiable.
The Agency can act on inequities based on 
scientific data. Evaluating the existence of 
injustice and racism is more difficult 
because they take into account socioeconomic 
factors in addition to the distribution of 
environmental benefits that are beyond the 
scope of this report.8
The Equity Workgroup thus viewed environmental equity as
quantifiable using scientific risk analytic methods. These
methods are informed by the objectivist epistemology
discussed in the last chapter. However, this methodology is
limited because it does not incorporate values into the
decision process except at the point where inferences are
made. The public is not included in the decision process at
the point where inferences are made. Furthermore, values
cannot be quantified.
Rather than discussing various conceptions of justice
and agreeing on principles of environmental justice to guide
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Workgroup decided
against adopting a single philosophy of justice or equity.9
While Reilly called for the impartial application of
rules in order to remedy the equity problem, former EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus argued in an article
published in 1985, that "the values and assumptions that
underlie those [environmental] decisions must be made
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manifest."10 But, this is a limitation of the traditional 
decision making model as was discussed in Chapter Four.
Modem welfare economic theory provides the basis for 
the traditional model of decision making. Within this 
paradigm
individual decision makers - whether a single 
manager, an agency, or a nation-state - will 
make decisions that maximize their own 
welfare. Self-interest, narrowly defined, 
produces the best decisions and, added 
together, all self-interested decisions 
result in the maximum welfare for the entire 
society11.
The traditional model is informed by utilitarian 
theory12 which assumes that achieving maximum welfare for 
the entire society usually involves disproportionately 
burdening a minority of the population. Utilitarians justify 
the imposition of a greater risk burden on one group if the 
inposition maximizes benefits for a larger group. However, 
moral questions arise when imposing burdens onto a group. 
Were they given an opportunity to participate in a 
substantive and meaningful way in the decision process?13 In 
Chapter Four I argued that the public participation 
guidelines exclude many citizens from the process because of 
structural barriers. The Emelle case, discussed in Chapter 
Three, supports the conclusion that without a real and 
meaningful opportunity to participate, the inposition of 
hazardous waste is thus immoral and unjust.
Both the Emelle case and the Love Canal case show that 
decisions made from a self-interested position do not
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necessarily contribute to the well-being of the entire 
society. As Bailey notes, externalities14 are generally 
ignored when using the traditional model because they occur 
outside the frame of reference of the decision maker. When 
using this model as the basis for making environmental 
decisions, the negative costs imposed on a community when a 
policy is implemented may not be calculated into the 
decision matrix. If the social costs of a decision are not 
considered and the decision has negative impacts, then 
questions of fairness and justice arise. However, within the 
traditional model " [s]ocial equity is a fundamentally 
different goal, and it is an anomaly unless it can be shown 
to be cost-benefit efficient."15 Thus, the traditional model 
is not designed to consider questions of fairness or 
justice.
Rawlsian Justice
The position taken by the EPA under William Reilly 
share some similarities with the welfare liberal conception 
of justice. This theory of justice was developed by John 
Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice published in 1971.16 
The basis of Rawls' is referred to as "contractual 
fairness."17 It is anti-utilitarian.18 Rawls argues that fair 
distribution in economic opportunities and social conditions 
should be based on "justice as fairness".19 Distribution of 
benefits are fair if principles of justice are chosen behind
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a "veil of ignorance" from an "original position" where all 
participants are equal. Rawls describes the original 
position "as a purely hypothetical situation characterized 
so as to lead to a certain conception of justice."20 In the 
original position, a person does not know his/her race, 
class or gender, what position in society s/he holds, or 
what talents and abilities s/he possesses because the "veil 
of ignorance" prevents them from a subjective perspective.
It is only in this position, Rawls argues, that a fair 
conception of justice can be agreed upon by the members of 
society.
Rawls was influenced by Immanuel Kant. In Chapter Five 
I discussed Kant's categorical imperative in more detail. 
Since it provides the basis for Rawls's theory of justice, I 
will briefly review the key points. Kant argued that humans 
should act rationally when making moral decisions. 
Rationality, from the Kantian perspective, requires the 
moral agent to assume an objective, disinterested, 
autonomous standpoint. From this standpoint, moral decisions 
are made based on a principle of impartiality. According to 
Rawls's theory moral decisions are made behind a "veil of 
ignorance." Behind this veil "all will reason from identical 
assumptions and the same universal point of view" as 
"rational and disinterested persons" not taking an interest 
in one another's interests."21
Critical theorists, influenced by the work of
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intellectuals from the Frankfurt School, argue that "there 
is no such thing as an objectively neutral or disinterested 
perspective."22 As we saw in the last chapter values and 
assumptions are made explicit is through a discursive 
process.
Current participation procedures and the impartial 
application of rules advocated by Reilly truncate the 
possibilities for a truly discursive, deliberative process 
were public values can be discovered. This is because of the 
limitations of the methodologies used by EPA, the processes 
used to make decisions, and more fundamentally, the 
epistemological and moral standpoints these methodologies 
and procedures require.
In the last chapter I discussed the positions of 
environmental justice advocates who argue that environmental 
justice requires a subjective, contextual approach. Current 
debates in moral theory revolve around the "care" versus 
"rule" orientation of the Rawlsian theory of justice. In the 
next section I will examine the Seventeen Principles of 
Environmental Justice and present arguments that justice 
requires a moral standpoint of care.
The Seventeen Principles Of Environmental Justice
The First People of Color Leadership Conference was 
held in Washington D.C. in October 1991. The conference drew 
participants from all over the country. Seventeen Principles
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of Environmental Justice emerged from the conference (See 
Appendix A) . The principles outline the basic tenets of the 
emerging emancipatory environmentalism from the perspectives 
of environmental justice advocates.
Under the sponsorship of the United Church of Christ, 
the Michigan Coalition organized another conference held 
during October 1991. The First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Conference was held in Washington, 
D.C. Seventeen Principles of Environmental Justice were 
adopted by participants at the First People of Color 
Leadership Conference. These principles articulate the basic 
tenets of the emerging emancipatory environmentalism from 
the perspectives of environmental justice advocates (see 
Appendix).
Themes from the Seventeen Principles of Environmental 
Justice include the spiritual connection and interdependence 
of all peoples to the Earth; the importance of sustainable 
development; respect and justice for all peoples in public 
policies; protection from nuclear testing and disposal of 
toxic waste; the right to self-determination of all peoples; 
the right to participate in decision making as equal 
partners; and the necessity of reprioritizing our lifestyles 
by limiting consumption.
Spirituality plays an important role in emancipatory 
environmentalism.23 This indicates represents a key 
ontological difference between the emancipatory and
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traditional paradigms. The first principle of environmental 
justice which states that the earth has sacred value and all 
life is interconnected in ecological unity. Because life is 
considered to be interconnected, this principle differs from 
the Cartesian ontology that informs traditional 
environmentalism.
Another significant principle of environmental justice 
recognizes the importance of equal participation in the 
decision making process based on mutual respect for all 
peoples. Thus, a further challenge to citizen participation 
is the inclusion of various cultural, epistemological, and 
ethical standpoints.
Since environmental justice assumes interdependence and 
interconnection, then traditional decision making techniques 
based on the assumptions of disinterest, separation, and 
autonomy of decision makers are fundamentally flawed. This 
means that Kantian-Rawlsian theories of justice and ethics 
will not work as theories of environmental justice or 
ethics.
In the next section, I discuss other theories of 
justice.
Other Theories of Justice
Wenz proposes a theory of environmental justice that 
is based on a "concentric circle theory."24 The concentric 
circle theory proposes that "the closer our relationship is
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to someone or something, the greater our number of 
obligations in that relationship.1,25 This is a gross 
oversimplification of Wenz's theory, but the point I wanted 
to make is that Wenz views environmental justice as arising 
out of our relationships with others - both human and non­
human nature. Within the context of relationships we can 
make decisions about our responsibilities to the 
environment.
Wenz argues that Rawls's theory is not practical 
because people are not equal in power, some people can 
coerce others using resources, and people know what they 
have.26 Wenz argues that Rawls's theory is not practical 
because people are not equal in power, some people can 
coerce others using resources, and people know what they 
have.27 Although Wenz does not explicitly argue for a 
culturally specific theory of justice, he does note that 
differences in social position can impact moral 
decisionmaking.
Both Gilligan and Cortese discuss the importance of 
relationships in moral decision making. Cortese argues that 
"[r] elationships provide the context and the basis for any 
type of justice, any code of moral principles for which we 
live."28 Although we may understand justice as a concept, 
unless justice is something we practice in relationships 
with others, it is
merely a set of empty mathematical, reified
formuli...[i]f we have no deep sense of relationship,
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we may have a conceptualization of the highest level of
justice, but we will not be moral.29
Gilligan argues that women make moral decisions from an 
"ethic of care" that occurs within the context of 
relationships in contrast to the conception of morality as 
developing from the inpersonal application of rules.30 Since 
all of us exist in relationship to our environment, then 
adopting a caring perspective is preferable to a rights 
approach in developing a theory of environmental justice.
Wenz criticizes Rawls's theory of justice from an 
environmental perspective. His conclusions are similar to
those developed by Cortese and Gilligan in some ways. But a
major difference between Gilligan and Cortese's positions 
and Wenz' s theory is the fact that Wenz' s theory is 
explicitly ecocentric. While Cortese and Gilligan argue that 
justice is process-oriented and contextual, none of these 
theorists argue that the environment is a part of the moral 
community. Thus, Wenz's theory provides us with an
ecocentric theory while the other theories are
anthropocentric.
Thus far, I have argued that Rawls's theory is 
inadequate as a theory of environmental justice because of 
the standpoint it requires. While the Seventeen Principles 
of Environmental Justice do not explicitly suggest justice 
requires a relational context, I argue that because of the 
ontological assumption of interconnection a relational 
context is implicitly suggested.
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Gilligan, Cortese, and Wenz argue that a relational 
context for making decisions about justice is preferable to 
the impartial applications of rules. Their positions are 
supported by Aristotle.31 Aristole argues that justice is 
"another's good." Justice thus requires we consider how 
others will be affected by our decisions. This implies that 
decisions about justice are made within the context of 
relationships. Because environmental justice requires a 
relational approach, Aristotle's theory of justice may thus 
serve as a more adequate theory of environmental justice 
than does that of John Rawls.
Conclusions
The position taken by the EPA under the leadership of 
William Reilly appeared to share many similarities with 
Rawls's theory of justice. I have argued that Rawls's theory 
is inadequate as a theory of environmental justice for 
environmental decision making if we assume the 
interdependence of all living things, and the tendency for 
humans to care about and for one another.
Aristotle's principle of justice as "another's good" 
may present us with a more adequate theory of environmental 
justice for environmental decision making. This is because 
environmental justice requires a situated perspective where 
emotions and the ability to reason are valued as necessary 
components of a just decision process. An environmental
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justice decision making process should thus allow for the 
subjective, contextual, and specific perspectives of 
historically situated subjects in specific geographic 
locations. To base environmental policies on a theory of 
justice that assumes a universal moral perspective is flawed 
because of fundamental differences in the ontological 
assumptions of traditional and emancipatory 
environmentalism.
Within the emancipatory environmenatal paradigm, 
citizens have both a right and a responsibility to 
participate as fully functioning moral and intellectual 
humans in the environmental decision making process. In the 
next chapter I address the rights and responsibilities 
challenge by arguing for the creation of neighborhood 
environmental justice centers. Similar to the Greek polis, 
neighborhood centers could serve as a public place where 
community residents could develop their citizenship skills 
in a local, neighborhood setting.
ENDNOTES
1. This term was used by Robert Bullard in personal 
conversations (October, 1993 to February, 1994) to describe 
the group of scholar-activists who kept the environmental 
equity/justice issue on the national political agenda.
2. Bryant, Bunyan and Mohai, Paul, "The Michigan Conference: 
A Turning Point," EPA Journal. March/April, 1992, vol.18, 
no. 1, pgs. 9-10.
3. These issues included: 1) Undertaking research towards 
understanding the environmental risks faced by minority and 
low income communities, 2) Initiating projects to enhance 
risk communication targeted to minority and low-income 
population groups, 3) Requiring, on a demonstration basis, 
that racial and socio-economic equity considerations be 
included in Regulatory Impact Assessments, 4) Ensuring that 
a racial and socio-economic dimension is overlaid on present 
and future geographic studies of environmental risk, 5) 
Enhancing the ability of "historically black colleges and 
universities" (HBCUs) and other minority institutions to 
participate in and contribute to the development of 
environmental equity, 6) Appointing special assistants for 
environmental equity at decision-making levels within 
agencies, and 7) Developing a policy statement on 
environmental equity. Bryant, Bunyan and Mohai, Paul, "The 
Michigan Conference: A Turning Point," EPA Journal. 
March/April 1992, vol. 18, no. 1, pg. 10.
4. EPA Journal. March, 1993, pg. 11.
5.Ibid.
6. Ember, Lois, "House Subcommittee Blasts EPA's 
Environmental Equity Report," Chemical and Engineering News. 
Vol. 70, No. 13, March 30, 1992, pgs. 13-15.
7. United States EPA, Office of Policy, Planning, and 
Evaluation. Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk For All 
Communities. Volume 1, June, 1992, pg. 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
113
114
10. Ruckelshaus, 1985, pg. 35.
11. Bailey, 1992, pg. 36.
12. According to Bellah, et al, (1991:28) cost-benefit 
analysis "is the classic formula of welfare economics, as it 
is of philosophical utilitarianism, the intellectual parent 
of economics."
13. See K. S. Shrader Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk 
and the Case Acrainst Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste 
(CA: University of California Press) 1994, pg.184.
14. Externalities are costs that are incurred to individuals 
or society as a whole as a result of an action. When Hooker 
Chemical dumped hazardous waste in Love Canal it 
externalized the cost of waste disposal.
15. Bailey, 1992, pg. 49.
16. Rawls John A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press) 1971.
17. Rawls expands the social contract theory of Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant.
18. Although I just argued against a utilitarian model of 
decision making, I do not think Rawls's theory of justice 
provides us with an adequate model for environmental 
decision making.
19. Rawls, pg. 11.
20. Rawls, pg. 12.
21. Young, pg. 101.
22. Nielsen, Joyce, 1992, pg. 9.
23 . I owe this insight to Karen Warren, "Environmental 
Stewardship: An Ecofeminist Philosophical Perspective," 
unpublished paper presented at the North American Society 
for Social Philosophy, August 1994, Las Vegas, Nevada.
24. Wenz, Peter, Environmental Justice (Albany, New York: 
1988) .
25. Ibid, pg. 1988.
26. Wenz, Peter Environmental Justice (Albany NY: SUNY 
Press) 1988, pg. 235.
115
27. Wenz, Peter Environmental Justice (Albany NY: SUNY 
Press) 1988, pg. 235.
28. Cortese, pg. 157.
29. Cortese, pg. 158.
30. Gilligan, Carol In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women1 s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press) 1982, pg. 19.
31. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
CHAPTER SEVEN
AN EMANCIPATORY ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRATEGY
In this study I analyzed the epistemological and 
ethical assumptions of the traditional environmental 
decision making model, and showed that the model excludes 
substantive participation by low-income and minority 
citizens. I argued that the traditional model is inadequate 
because it excludes citizens on two levels: structurally and 
epistemologically. Structural exclusion occurs because 
access to the necessary material resources for participation 
in the process are shaped by class, gender, and race 
relations. This exclusion is exacerbated by epistemological 
and ethical assumptions that assume the white, male 
perspective is normative. Thus, fundamental changes in the 
epistemological presumptions of current public participation 
procedures and environmental policies are necessary if the 
goal of environmental justice is to be achieved.
In conclusion, I review the four challenges discussed 
in the previous chapters.
Technology And The Public Values Challenge
Environmental justice advocates argue that the
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processes used to make siting decisions are unfair and 
contribute to a disproportionate burden of regressive 
impacts in low-income and poor communities. I have shown 
that the current model does exclude women and minorities on 
two levels.
Procedural fairness, as defined by environmental 
justice advocates, is a deliberative process of decision 
making based on principles of participatory democracy. An 
emancipatory model integrates different types of knowledge 
and ways of knowing into the decision process. An 
emancipatory decision making model is premised on the belief 
that justice arises from a discursive process that occurs 
within the context of relationships. To achieve the goal of 
an environmental justice in decision making, many changes 
will need to occur, including changes in the public 
participation guidelines, and changes in the relationships 
between EPA officials and community residents.
Furthermore, explicit discussion about what constitutes 
environmental justice needs to take place as part of the 
environmental decision making process because there appears 
to be confusion about the meaning of the term. This 
definition could then serve as a heuristic guide, or guiding 
principle, throughout the decision making process. The 
decision making process would thus be a hermeneutic process.
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The Epistemological Challenge
I argued that an emancipatory decision process 
requires recognizing the validity of alternative 
epistemologies, thus integrating other ways of knowing in 
the environmental decision making process. An emancipatory 
decision making model would attempt to balance subjectivity 
and objectivity, facts and values, reason with emotion. 
Within this decision model, all participants would be 
considered equals. Expert knowledge and lay knowledge would 
be valued equally, thus dissolving the epistemological 
barriers that prevent substantive participation.
Since the current process implicitly excludes women and 
minorities, then programs should be developed that are 
sensitive to the forms of expression that develops the 
"voices" of women, minorities, and low income citizens. This 
means the format of public meetings and hearings will need 
to be changed in order to facilitate a deliberative policy 
process that is open and honest and encourages the 
expression of values and emotions.
The Challenge Of Public Participation
Research by Berry, Portney, and Thomson suggests that 
as citizens develop a sense of empowerment, they are more 
likely to participate in face-to-face political activity. 
This sense of empowerment increases citizen's beliefs about 
their own effectiveness in influencing local government.
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Other research suggests that citizens are more likely to
support the outcome of the distributive decision making
process when they have the opportunity to express
themselves.1
Lind and Tyler argue that
The value that citizens attach to voice 
suggests that political allegiance is 
enhanced by allowing open argument about 
government policy. Allowing citizens to 
express their opinions and disagreements 
leads to feelings that fair process has 
occurred in decision making, promoting 
diffuse support for the political system.2
This supports the conclusion that public participation
programs are more likely to be considered legitimate if they
offer citizens real opportunities for involvement in the
policy process. To insure real legitimacy, however, citizens
should have the authority to veto corporate decisions that
violate accepted principles of environmental justice.
Since lower classes, racial minorities, and women have
been excluded from the decision making process, programs
that potentially remedy class inequities should be made a
priority in environmental justice policy strategies. This
would require broadening the scope of environmental policies
to include social justice concerns. In order to facilitate a
process that integrates environmental and social justice
concerns, EPA should consider hiring social workers with
skills in community organizing and group facilitation.
Since citizen participation programs are subject to
partisan control by the Federal, state, or local government,
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funding for programs could be generated through fines 
inposed on corporations for violating environmental laws. 
This could be part of the remediation paid to communities 
that currently share more than their burden of hazardous 
facilities. Monies for pollution prevention programs could 
be funded in the same way. In fact, pollution prevention 
should be a key component in all environmental justice 
strategies.
Citizens will need to develop their public deliberation 
skills. This could be acconplished by integrating 
deliberative decision making models into the core curriculum 
at all levels of school. This could potentially prepare them 
to become active citizens as adults.
The Rights and Responsibilities Challenge
Although NEPA does not guarantee environmental rights, 
it clearly indicates citizens have the responsibility to 
protect the environment. The emancipatory environmental 
paradigm enphasizes both environmental rights and 
responsibilities. One way to accomplish this goal would be 
to amend NEPA and all subsequent environmental policies to 
include environmental justice as a policy goal. This would 
be achieved by developing a balanced rights and a 
responsibilities approach base on principles of 
environmental democracy.
Environmental democracy requires that citizens take
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their responsibilities for participation seriously. A 
deliberative, localized approach to environmental decision 
making may increase the representation of lower socio­
economic groups in the policy process. Since most low income 
individuals are concerned with issues of survival, it may be 
unrealistic to expect an increase in political participation 
until class, racial, and gender inequities are addressed. 
Thus, environmental justice strategies should incorporate 
measures to end economic and social injustice.
How can these suggestions be implemented? First, we 
must create accessible community centers where environmental 
justice can be practiced at the local level. These 
neighborhood environmental justice centers could serve as a 
meeting place for citizens and EPA officials to hold local 
focus groups to facilitate discussion about what constitutes 
environmental justice within a particular locale. By 
discovering and discussing ethical principles in a public 
place, citizens and experts might begin to discover that 
ethical and political transformations are inevitable, on 
both a personal and societal level, in order to achieve the 
goal of environmental justice. By developing a vision of an 
environmentally just society together, community residents 
and government officials could then work together to make 
that vision can become a reality.
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Neighborhood Environmental Justice Centers
Environmental participation programs should be 
integrated into existing city wide citizen involvement 
programs. This could potentially strengthen environmental 
participation programs by eliminating some of the barriers 
to participation that were pointed out in Chapter Four.
In cities where citizen participation programs are not yet 
institutionalized, programs could be established by 
community volunteers with funds from remediation paid by 
waste producing corporations. Funds from Community 
Development Block Grants could be utilized to fund centers. 
Centers could operate out of local schools, libraries, or 
other multi-service public facilities in low-income 
neighborhoods, but each center should not serve more than 
one hundred people.
Neighborhood environmental justice centers would serve 
as community centers where neighbors participate in numerous 
activities to increase their political capacities. Copying 
facilities, informational materials, educational programs, 
and a location for local meetings could be established at 
the centers. By locating environmental justice centers in 
local neighborhoods, citizens might be more likely to access 
center services and participate in environmental decisions.
By involving community volunteers in the development of 
neighborhood environmental justice centers, administrative 
costs could be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, centers could
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provide a place for neighborhood residents to gain community 
organizing skills and other types of work experience. Social 
workers could be hired to facilitate political organizing 
around environmental issues in the settlement house 
tradition of Jane Addam's Hull House. By developing 
neighborhood centers, waste issues would find their rightful 
place as issues involving community and home, families and 
friends. Decisions could thus be made by neighbors within a 
relational context.
Feasibility of Policy Proposal
While this may be an idealistic proposal, I believe it 
has the potential to create positive change in citizens and 
to build communities. Better decisions would be made about 
the environment. The spirit of community that has been 
virtually lost in contemporary society could be rediscovered 
as neighbors begin to care about one another and the common 
ground they share.
But even if it is only a vision, the words of Margaret 
Mead remind me that efforts to empower and emancipate 
citizens should not be abandoned in the face of dismal 
realities: "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful and 
committed citizens can change the world. Indeed it is the 
only thing that ever has. "
ENDNOTES
1. Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and McGraw, 1986; Spodick, 
1985; Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick, 1985.
2. Lind and Tyler, ibid, pg. 170.
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APPENDIX
SEVENTEEN PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The preamble and seventeen Principles of Environmental 
Justice are:
We, the People of Color, gathered together at this 
multinational People of Color Environmental Leadership 
Summit, to begin to build a nation and international 
movement of all peoples of color to fight the 
destruction and taking of our lands, and communities, do 
hearby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the 
sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and celebrate 
each of our cultures,languages, and beliefs about the 
natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to ensure 
environmental justice; to promote economic alternatives 
which would contribute to the development of environmentally 
safe livelihoods; and, to secure our political, economic and 
cultural liberation that has been denied for over 500 years 
of colonization and oppression, resulting in the poisoning 
of our communities and land and the genocide of our peoples, 
do affirm and adopt these Principles of Environmental 
Justice:
1. Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of 
Mother Earth, ecological unity and the 
interdependence of all species, and the right to 
be free from ecological destruction.
2. Environmental justice demands that public 
policy be based on mutual respect for all 
peoples, free from any form of discrimination or 
bias.
3. Environmental justice mandates the right to 
ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and 
renewable resources in the interest of a 
sustainable planet for humans and other living 
things.
4. Environmental justice calls for universal 
protection from nuclear testing, extraction, and 
the fundamental right to clean air, land, water,
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and food.
5. Environmental justice affirms the fundamental 
right to political, economic, cultural and 
environmental self-determination of all peoples.
6. Environmental justice demands the cessation of 
the production of all toxins, hazardous waste, and 
radioactive materials, and that all past and 
current producers be held strictly accountable to 
the people for detoxification and the containment 
at the point of production.
7. Environmental justice demands the right of all 
to participate as equal partners at every level of 
decision-making including needs assessment, 
planning, implementation, and enforcement and 
evaluation.
8. Environmental justice affirms the right of all 
workers to a safe and healthy work environment, 
without being forced to choose between an unsafe 
livelihood and unemployment. It also affirms the 
right of those who work at home to be free from 
environmental hazards.
9. Environmental justice protects the right of 
victims of environmental injustices to receive 
full compensation and reparations for damages as 
well as quality health care.
10. Environmental justice considers governmental 
acts of environmental injustice a violation of 
international law, the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, and the United Nations convention on 
Genocide.
11. Environmental justice must recognize a special 
legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples 
to the U.S. government through treaties, 
agreements, compacts, and covenants which impose 
upon the U. S. government a paramount obligation 
and responsibility to affirm the sovereignty and 
self-determination of the indigenous peoples whose 
lands it occupies and holds in trusts.
12. Environmental justice affirms the need for 
urban and rural ecological policies to clean up 
and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance 
with nature, honoring the cultural integrity of 
all our communities, and providing fair access 
for all to the full range of resources.
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13. Environmental justice calls for the strict 
enforcement of principles of informed consent, and 
a halt to the testing of experimental 
reproductive and medical procedures and 
vaccinations on people of color.
14. Environmental justice opposes the destructive 
operations of multinational corporations.
15. Environmental justice opposes military 
occupation, repression and the exploitation of 
lands, peoples and cultures, and other life forms.
16. Environmental justice calls for the education 
of present and future generations which emphasizes 
social and environmental issues, based on our 
experience and an appreciation of our diverse 
cultural perspectives.
17. Environmental justice requires that we, as 
individuals, make personal and consumer choices to 
consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and 
to produce as little waste as possible; and to 
make the conscious decisions to challenge and 
reprioritize our lifestyles to ensure the health 
of the natural world for present and future 
generations.
From Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of 
Environmental Justice, edited by Richard Hofrichter, 
(Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1993), pgs. 237- 
239.
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